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Abstract
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information
about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive ad-
vantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by
means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the
prices to be paid are revealed to all firms. This provides an opportunity for sig-
naling. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which bids perfectly identify the
bidders’ costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market com-
petition, the specific auction format, and the bid announcement policy.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of a selling mechanism such as an auction is often reduced to a one-
stage game where buyers do not meet again in the future. There are, however, a lot
of situations where the outcome of an auction crucially affects further interactions
among buyers. For instance, buyers might be firms that bid in an auction in order
to gain access to a new market or the right to use a new technology that gives them
a competitive advantage. If the firms taking part in the auction are at the same time
also rivals in themarket for their products, the behavior in the auction is certainly in-
fluenced by the expected outcome of future market interactions and vice versa. The
auctionmight not only have an impact on later stages because it changes the market
environment by allocating competitive advantages, but also because it might change
the informational structure. When firms have private information about demand or
cost parameters, participating in the auction can to some extent reveal this informa-
tion to rivals. In particular, firms might use their bids as signals.
In this paper we analyze a two-stage model of an oligopoly where firms have pri-
vate information about their costs of production. In the first stage firms bid in a
multi-object auction to win access to a cost reducing technology that is limited to a
subset of the firms. In the second stage firms then compete in the market. We con-
sider three types of sealed-bid auction rules: the all-pay auction where all bidders
are asked to pay their bid, the discriminatory auction where only the winners pay
their bid, and the uniform-price auction where the winners all pay the highest losing
bid. Do firms in this situation actually use the auction in the first stage as a signaling
device to such an extent that bids perfectly identify costs? In order to answer this
question we will explore under what circumstances this game has a fully separating
equilibrium.
There are several possible applications for our model. As an example for the dis-
criminatory and uniform-price auction, consider an outside innovator who employs
one of the two auction rules to sell to firms a limited number of licenses for using a
cost reducing innovation.1 Regarding the all-pay format, we can, e.g., interpret bid-
ding in such an auction as lobbying activities by firms that try to convince politi-
1Although often used in practice, selling licenses through an auction similar to the ones we con-
sider in this paper is in most cases not the optimal mechanism for the innovator. For the case of a
Cournot oligopoly with complete information, Giebe and Wolfstetter (2008) find that the innovator’s
revenue ismaximized by a combination of a license auction with royalty contracts (for both losers and
winners).
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cians to grant them (rather than their competitors) subsidies.2 Especially in situa-
tions where firms disclose their expenses in a lobbying register, using those bids as
signals is possible. Similarly, a research and development race among firms can be
modeled as an all-pay auction.
An important factor affecting the existence of a separating equilibrium is the type
of competition in the second stage. In a setting where firms, using a linear technol-
ogy, produce differentiated products sold to a market with linear demand, we con-
sider both the Cournot model where firms choose quantities as well as the Bertrand
model where firms set prices. In both cases the value of winning the auction is higher
for low-cost firms. The signaling incentive, however, differs. UnderCournot competi-
tion firms aim at understating their costs in order to appear stronger and gain a larger
market share. The opposite is true under Bertrand competition. Here, firms prefer
to overstate their costs in order for their rivals to set higher prices. In both cases this
signaling incentive is strongest for low-cost firms. Hence, under Bertrand competi-
tion, firms who would bid highest in the absence of signaling, have also the strongest
incentive to reduce their bid for signaling purposes. Therefore, the existence of a sep-
arating equilibrium is in general more problematic under Bertrand competition than
under Cournot competition where the two effects point into the same direction.
The differences in terms of signaling incentives between the two types of compe-
tition have beenwell known. For example, Gal-Or (1986) studies amodel where firms
with privately known costs choose the amount of information to be revealed before
entering the market competition stage. Gal-Or (1986) finds that in the Bertrand case
firms choose to reveal no information at all, whereas in the Cournot model they fully
reveal their marginal costs. Ziv (1993) studies pure (costly) signaling in a Cournot
market with privately known costs. There, rather than bidding for an object with
intrinsic value, firms simply burn money in order to signal their strength which is
observed by all competitors. Under Bertrand competition such a separating equilib-
rium is impossible.
Of course, the existence of a separating equilibrium also depends on how strong
signaling incentives are. This depends, in turn, on how much information firms can
infer from the auction. The auctioneer might disclose all or only some of the firms’
bids. In this paper we concentrate on the cases where either all bids are revealed, or
where the amount each firm has to pay is announced. For the all-pay auction there
2Lobbying is generally thought to be well represented by an all-pay auction. See, e.g., Baye,
Kovenock, and de Vries (1993).
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is, of course, no difference among those two possibilities. For the discriminatory
auction, announcing the prices to be paid means that only the winners’ bids are dis-
closed, while the highest losing bid alone is revealed in the uniform-price auction. In
general, we find that if the auction reveals less information, there aremore situations
where a separating equilibrium is possible under Bertrand competition.
For the existence of a separating equilibrium it is also important that the pay-
ment rules allow for credible signals, i.e., the firms that actually send a signal must
also pay accordingly. This is the case in the all-pay auction with all bids revealed and
the discriminatory auction with only the winning bids revealed. In those cases the
separating equilibrium is likely to exist. When all bids are announced in a discrim-
inatory auction, however, bids from firms with high costs that are pretty sure that
they do not have to pay anything are for this reason not very credible. Consequently,
a separating equilibrium exists under those circumstances only as a special case.
Closely related to our model is Das Varma (2003) where a cost reducing innova-
tion is allocated among oligopolists through a first-price auction. The amount by
which costs are reduced varies among firms and is private information, resulting in
an incentive to signal. Das Varma (2003) finds that in the case of Cournot competition
there is a unique equilibriumwhere bids fully reveal all private information, whereas
in the Bertrand case such an equilibriummay fail to exist. In a relatedmodel, Goeree
(2003) extends the analysis of the Cournot case to second-price and English auctions.
In contrast to those authors we assume in this paper that the cost reduction is
common knowledge and identical for all firms. Instead, it is ex ante costs that are
private information. An important consequence of this is that not only the private in-
formation of winners, but also that of losers is relevant for the second stage. An auc-
tion of a cost-reducing innovation to Bertrand competitors with private ex ante costs
is also studied by Moldovanu and Sela (2003). Yet by assuming that costs always be-
come common knowledge after the auction, they exclude any signaling effects from
their model.3 Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2008) consider an auction among firms
with private costs as well. In their model, what is allocated through the auction is
access to a duopoly with an incumbent firm. Hence, unlike in our model, signals are
sent to an outsider rather than to the other bidders. Note that we keep our analy-
sis of the auction stage in Section 3 at a fairly general level, so that, as we show in
Subsection 3.5, it also covers several of the models discussed above.
3Similarly, signaling effects are also excluded from themodel of Jehiel andMoldovanu (2000) who,
as an example for a more general case, analyze an auction of a privately known cost reduction to
Cournot competitors.
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The literature has, so far, almost exclusively focused on single-object auctions.
One of the rare exceptions is Katsenos (2008) who compares simultaneous and se-
quential auctions for selling two licenses that grant access to a duopoly to firms with
private costs. In this paper, we analyze multi-object auctions while allowing for the
number of winners to be any number smaller than the number of firms. Not only
seems the case of multiple winners relevant for applications, such as an innovator
sellingmore than one license, but we also find that the existence of a separating equi-
librium on some occasions crucially depends on the number of winners.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the main assumptions
of the model. In Section 3 we develop a general framework for analyzing the bidding
behavior in the first stage without having the second stage modeled explicitly, yet.
Our specific model of the second stage is then presented in Section 4. In Section 5
we analyze the existence of a separating equilibrium when the auctioneer reveals all
bids whereas in Section 6 we consider the case where the prices paid are disclosed.
We gather conclusions in Section 7, followed by an appendix containing proofs.
2 The Model
There are n firms that compete in a product market. Firms are all identical except
for a firm specific cost parameter c i . We assume that the lower c i , the lower are
firm i ’s variable costs. For example, if firms have linear technologies, c i are the con-
stant marginal costs of firm i . The cost parameter c i is private information of firm
i . It is common knowledge that c1,c2, . . . ,cn are realizations of the random variables
C1,C2, . . . ,Cn which are independently and identically distributed according to F on
the interval

c ,c

. The distribution F is twice continuously differentiable, having a
strictly positive density f := F ′. We assume limc↓c F ′′(c ) ∈ R and limc↑c F ′′(c ) ∈ R. In
addition, there exists some new technology the use of which generates a competitive
advantage. Yet only k < n firms are allowed to use this technology, access to it being
sold through a sealed-bid auction.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage firms submit their bids and
the auctioneer determines the k winners of the auction. In addition to the identities
of the winners, the auctioneer also publicly reveals the values of a subset of the bids
according to a commonly known announcement rule. Then, all firms enter into the
second stage of the gamewhere they compete in the productmarket. When choosing
their action in the second stage, firms update their beliefs about their competitors’
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cost parameters according to what they learn from the auctioneer’s announcement
in the first stage.
We focus on separating equilibria, i.e., on equilibria where a firm’s bidding strat-
egy prescribes a different amount for each type. As equilibrium concept we adopt the
symmetric perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where symmetric means that ex ante
all firms use the same equilibriumbidding strategy. In order to find an equilibrium of
the whole game, we typically solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the market
interaction in the second stage given the beliefs firmsmight hold after having played
the first stage. From this we obtain the expected payoffs of firms when they choose
their bid in the first stage.
Whether or not a firm wins the auction and gains access to the new technology
typically depends on the ranking of the firms in terms of their cost parameters. Also,
whose bids the auctioneer reveals depends on that ranking. Hence, in the course of
its decision-making, firm i has to form expectations about the ranking (and values)
of the cost parameters of its rivals. The following definitions will therefore be of great
use throughout the paper. Define C −i := {C1,C2, . . . ,Cn}\C i to be the set of cost pa-
rameters of the competitors of firm i . Let Z i1,Z
i
2, . . . ,Z
i
n−1 be a rearrangement of all
C j ∈ C −i so that Z
i
1 ≤ Z
i
2 ≤ · · · ≤ Z
i
n−1. Consequently, Z
i : =

Z i1,Z
i
2, . . . ,Z
i
n−1

is the
vector of order statistics of the cost parameters of firm i ’s rivals. Note that because
C1,C2, . . . ,Cn are independently and identically distributed, we can drop superscript
i in the following statements. The joint density of the order statistics Z is
g 1,2,...,n−1(z) = (n −1)! f (z 1) f (z 2) . . . f (z n−1)
if c ≤ z 1 ≤ z 2 ≤ · · · ≤ z n−1 ≤ c and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, the density and the
distribution function of the k th order statisticZk are
g k (z k ) =
(n −1)!
(k −1)! (n −1−k )!
F (z k )
k−1 (1− F (z k ))
n−1−k f (z k )
and
Gk (z k ) =
n−1∑
h=k

n −1
h

F (z k )
h (1− F (z k ))
n−1−h .
See, e.g., David and Nagaraja (2003) for a derivation of these results.
Some of the results we will obtain in the course of the paper require an additional
assumption concerning the distribution function F . More precisely, we will some-
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times assume the density f to be logconcave.4 As shown by An (1998), logconcavity
of f (c ) implies logconcavity of F (c ) as well as 1− F (c )which in turn implies
d
d c

F (c )
f (c )

≥ 0 and
d
d c
E [C |C < c ]≤ 1 (1)
as well as
d
d c

1− F (c )
f (c )

≤ 0 and
d
d c
E [C |C > c ]≤ 1. (2)
Moreover, one can easily verify that logconcavity of f (c ) also results in logconcavity
of g k (c )which, of course, implies logconcavity ofGk (c ) and 1−Gk (c ).
3 A Framework for Signaling in Auctions
In this section we analyze the bidding behavior in the auction conducted in the first
stage in a fairly general framework. Most notably, we postpone the formulation of
an explicit model of the product market in the second stage to the next section. In-
stead, we summarize the outcome of the second stage by two functions, πW and πL ,
that represent the profit a firm expects to earn at the beginning of the second stage,
depending on whether it belongs to the winners or to the losers of the auction. Of
course, these expected profits crucially depend on the beliefs firms hold about their
rivals’ costs.
As we have mentioned above, the auctioneer, after having received all the bids,
publicly reveals a subset of them. In doing so, the auctioneer follows an announce-
ment rule that specifies which bids are to be revealed depending on the order of the
bids. For example, this rule could be to announce the highest bid. As we focus on
separating equilibria, revealing bids is equivalent to revealing costs, since in equilib-
rium a firm’s cost parameter can directly be inferred from its bid. Thus, through the
auctioneer’s announcement all firms learn the realization and the rank of a subset of
all cost parameters. We denote this set of information about cost parameters by I .
Having learnt I in the auction stage, firms update their beliefs concerning their
4There are many widely used distributions that have this property. Among them are the uniform
distribution, the power distribution with an exponent> 1, the beta distribution with both parameters
≥ 1, the normal, exponential, extreme value, and logistic distribution. Of course, the last few distri-
butions do not fit our model since they have infinite support. Note, however, that logconcavity is pre-
served when constructing a new distribution by truncating the support of one of those distributions.
See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for a more detailed list and a proof of the truncation property.
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competitors’ cost parameters accordingly. As a result, firm i expects that the (or-
dered) vector of its rivals’ costs is ζi := E [Zi |I ]. In addition, firm i ’s choice of action
for the second stage also depends on how its own type is perceived by the other firms.
Let ξi := E [C i |I ] denote the cost parameter i ’s competitors believe firm i to have.5
We assume that for each firm i the expected profit in the second stage can be
expressed as a function of the realization of i ’s costs, of the costs i ’s rivals expect
it to have, and of the costs i expects its rivals to have. Therefore, with the above
definitions at hand, we denote by πW (c i ,ξ
i ,ζi ) the expected profit of firm i if it has
won the auction. Similarly, let πL(c i ,ξ
i ,ζi ) denote the expected profit of firm i if it
has lost the auction.
We assume that πW (c i ,ξ
i ,ζi )>πL(c i ,ξ
i ,ζi ) and that both functions are differen-
tiable in all of their arguments. Further, we assume
∂
∂ c i

πW (c i ,c i ,z
i )−πL(c i ,c i ,z
i )

≤ 0 ∀c i , (3)
i.e., under complete information, a low-cost firm benefits more from winning the
auction than a high-cost firm. Therefore, in the absence of any signaling effects, we
would expect a low-cost firm to be willing to pay more for winning the auction. That
is why we will in general look for a separating equilibrium where the firms with the
lowest cost parameters win the auction.6
3.1 A Direct Mechanism
For the derivation of equilibrium bidding in various auction formats, it is useful, as a
first step, to analyze a corresponding direct mechanism where firms, instead of plac-
ing a bid, are asked to report their types to the auctioneer. In our setting, such a
mechanism consists of three components: an allocation rule choosing the winners
among firms, a payment rule specifying the amount each firm has to pay, and an an-
5Note that with this definition of beliefs we assume that beliefs depend solely on the commonly
known information setI andnot on any private information. In doing sowe exclude some announce-
ment rules from our framework, as we further discuss below in Subsection 3.3.
6In fact, assumption (3) only requires the benefit from winning the auction to be monotone
in types. For example, suppose there is an oligopoly where each firm i has constant and positive
marginal cost s i ∈

s ,s

. By winning the auction a firm gains access to a superior technology exhibit-
ing marginal cost s ∗ < s . Hence, the benefit from winning is, in contrast to (3), increasing in s i and
we would expect the firms with the highest cost parameters s i to win the auction. However, as none
of our results in this section will rely on the assumption that lower c i correspond to lower costs, this
model perfectly fits our framework if we redefine firm i ’s type as c i := s + s − s i .
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nouncement rule for the auctioneer. As for the allocation rule, we focus on the class
of direct mechanisms that select the k firms with the lowest reported costs as win-
ners. Regarding the payment rule we take the following notational shortcut. Instead
of defining a function that fixes a payment for each firm depending on all reports, we
simply let mˆ (x ) denote the expected payment by a firm that reports to be of type x
while all its rivals report their true types. Let I denote the announcement rule where
I is a function returning a subset of the reports depending on their order. From now
on, we will refer to such a direct mechanism as 〈mˆ , I 〉.
A directmechanism that has an equilibriumwhere all firms choose to report their
type truthfully is called incentive compatible. An incentive compatible direct mech-
anism 〈mˆ , I 〉must therefore ensure that no firm has an incentive to unilaterally de-
viate from the truth-telling equilibrium. Consider the point of view of firm i that
reports type x while all other firms report their true type. Let z denote the realization
of Zi . In this case, the auctioneer’s announcement will depend on x and z, such that
we write the announcement as I (x ,z). The information set I contains the value of
I (x ,z) combinedwith knowledge about the exact functional form of I . Consequently,
given a specific announcement rule I , the beliefs relevant for firm i ’s expected profits
are also functions of x and z, such that we can write ξi = ξ(x ,z) and ζi= ζ(x ,z). Now,
define the expected second stage profit of firm i conditional on the order statisticZ ik
as
Πt (c i ,x ,z k ) := E

πt (c i ,ξ(x ,Z
i ),ζ(x ,Zi )) |Z i
k
= z k

=∫ z k
c
. . .
∫ z k
z k−2
∫ c
z k
. . .
∫ c
zn−2
πt (c i ,ξ(x ,z),ζ(x ,z))
g 1,...,n−1(z)
g k (z k )
d z n−1 . . .d z k+1d z k−1 . . .d z 1
for t =W,L. Since Zi follows the same distribution for all i , we will from now on drop
superscript i . When all other firms play according to the truth-telling equilibrium
strategy, the expected payoff of firm i that has cost parameter c and reports to have
cost parameter x is
U (c ,x ) :=−mˆ (x )+ (1−Gk (x ))E

πW (c ,ξ(x ,Z),ζ(x ,Z)) |Zk > x

+Gk (x )E

πL(c ,ξ(x ,Z),ζ(x ,Z)) |Zk < x

=−mˆ (x )+
∫ c
x
ΠW (c ,x ,z k )g k (z k )d z k +
∫ x
c
ΠL(c ,x ,z k )g k (z k )d z k . (4)
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The following lemma identifies incentive compatible direct mechanisms.7
Lemma 1. The direct mechanism 〈mˆ , I 〉 is incentive compatible if, ∀c ,x ∈

c ,c

,
mˆ (c ) = mˆ (c )+
∫ c
c

ΠW (y ,y ,y )−ΠL(y ,y ,y )

g k (y )d y
−
∫ c
c
∫ c
y
ΠW ′
2
(y ,y ,z k )g k (z k )d z kd y −
∫ c
c
∫ y
c
ΠL′
2
(y ,y ,z k )g k (z k )d z kd y (IC1)
and
U ′′
12
(c ,x ) =−

ΠW ′
1
(c ,x ,x )−ΠL′
1
(c ,x ,x )

g k (x )
+
∫ c
x
ΠW ′′
12
(c ,x ,z k )g k (z k )d z k +
∫ x
c
ΠL′′
12
(c ,x ,z k )g k (z k )d z k ≥ 0. (IC2)
Moreover, if 〈mˆ , I 〉 is incentive compatible, then (IC1) holds andU ′′
12
(c ,c )≥ 0.
Proof. The the direct mechanism 〈mˆ , I 〉 is incentive compatible if and only if
c ∈ argmax
x
U (c ,x ) ∀c ∈

c ,c

. (5)
Sufficient for (5) is the first order condition
U ′
2
(c ,c ) = 0 (6)
together with the condition that
U ′
2
(c ,x )≥ (≤)0 ∀x < (>)c ;c ,x ∈

c ,c

. (7)
Integrating (6) from c to c on both sides and rearranging, we obtain (IC1). Because
of (6) we have
U ′
2
(c ,x ) =
∫ c
x
U ′′
12
(y ,x )d y .
Hence,U ′′
12
(c ,x )≥ 0 ∀c ,x ∈

c ,c

is sufficient for (7) which is stated in (IC2).
7For a function H of multiple variables, we use H ′i to denote the partial derivative with respect to
the i th argument. Similarly, H ′′i j denotes the mixed partial derivative with respect to the i th and j th
argument.
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On the other hand, (6) andU ′′
22
(c ,c ) ≤ 0 are necessary for (5). Taking the deriva-
tive of (6) on both sides, we receiveU ′′
12
(c ,c ) +U ′′
22
(c ,c ) = 0 such thatU ′′
22
(c ,c ) ≤ 0 is
equivalent toU ′′
12
(c ,c )≥ 0.
In general, it does not seem plausible to assume that firms can be forced to take
part in the auction stage. Hence, we are interested in direct mechanisms where firms
voluntarily choose to participate. Such mechanisms are often referred to as being
individually rational. A mechanism is individually rational for a firm if its expected
equilibrium payoffU (c ,c ) is higher than the payoff it would earn when not partici-
pating. In our model, the value of a firm’s outside option is simply its expected profit
in the second stage without having access to the cost reducing technology. Hence,
in contrast to standard models in mechanism design theory, firm i ’s outside option
does crucially depend on the beliefs firms hold about the types of their competitors
when firm i is not participating.
Let us introduce a firm’s option not to participate as follows. Instead of reporting
a type in

c ,c

each firm can also report type κ> c in order to let the auctioneer know
that it abstains from taking part in the direct mechanism. If firm i has reported κ, it
is never selected as a winner and is not asked to pay anything. As for the announce-
ment of a subset of all reports, the auctioneer continues to apply rule I . Depending
on the specific form of I , i ’s opponents might ormight not observe that i has refused
to participate. Yet in both cases firms must have beliefs about what costs a firm has
that has reported κ. Since not participating lies outside the equilibrium path, beliefs
concerning this event are not restricted by a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. As the
following lemma shows, sufficient conditions for a mechanism to be individually ra-
tional are that the expected payment by a firm with cost parameter c is zero and that
firms treat a firm that reports κ as if it reports c .
Lemma 2. LetI κ denote the set of information firms learn through the auction if firm
i does not participate. The incentive compatible direct mechanism 〈mˆ , I 〉 is individu-
ally rational if mˆ (c ) = 0 and (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs are
E [C i |I
κ] = ξ(c ,z) and E [Zi |I κ] = ζ(c ,z). (8)
Proof. With beliefs (8) and mˆ (c ) = 0, the expected payoff of a firm with costs c is the
same regardless whether it participates or not. Therefore, a firm with costs c will not
refuse to participate. All other types of firms could, by reporting c instead of their true
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type, achieve the same payoff as if they did not participate. But since themechanism
is incentive compatible, they are better off participating and reporting truthfully.
Aswewill frequently refer to incentive compatible and individually rational direct
mechanisms throughout this paper, it is useful to simplify the exposition by defining
m (c ) :=
∫ c
c

ΠW (y ,y ,y )−ΠL(y ,y ,y )

g k (y )d y
−
∫ c
c
∫ c
y
ΠW ′
2
(y ,y ,z k )g k (z k )d z kd y −
∫ c
c
∫ y
c
ΠL′
2
(y ,y ,z k )g k (z k )d z kd y . (9)
Observe that by Lemmata 1 and 2, the direct mechanism 〈m , I 〉 is incentive compat-
ible if (IC2) while it is individually rational under beliefs (8).
3.2 Equilibrium Bidding in some Standard Auctions
In the following, we derive the equilibrium bidding strategies for three well-known
auction formats: the all-pay auction, the discriminatory auction, and the uniform-
price auction. In all three auctions access to the new technology is awarded to the k
highest bidders. The auctions differ, however, in terms of their payment rules. In the
all-pay auction, each firm has to pay its bid, regardless whether it has won or lost. In
both of the other formats, losers do not pay anything. The winners of a discrimina-
tory auction have to pay their bid, whereas in the uniform-price auction the winners
all must pay the highest losing bid.
In a separating equilibrium, firms bid according to a strictly monotone strategy
β :

c ,c

→ R+. Suppose an auction has a separating equilibrium with a strictly de-
creasing β . Thanks to the revelation principle, such an auction is equivalent to an
incentive compatible direct mechanism 〈mˆ , I 〉. Therefore, we can easily derive such
equilibrium strategies for the three auctions by making use of the results of the pre-
ceding subsection.
Proposition 1. Consider m (c ) as defined in (9) and suppose firms’ out-of-equilibrium
beliefs are represented by (8). Define
βA(c ) :=m (c ) , βD(c ) :=
m (c )
1−Gk (c )
, and βU (c ) :=−
m ′(c )
g k (c )
(10)
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where βA , βD , and βU denote bidding strategies for the all-pay, the discriminatory,
and the uniform-price auction. For T = A,D,U the following result holds: if (IC2) and
β ′
T
(c ) < 0, there exists an individually rational separating equilibrium of the auction
format T where a firm with cost parameter c bids the amount βT (c ). Provided the
auctioneer uses the same announcement rule I , all three auction formats are revenue
equivalent.
Proof. First note that for a separating equilibrium to exist, bidding strategies have to
be strictly monotone so that firms can infer types from revealed bids. If equilibrium
bidding strategies are strictly decreasing, all three auction formats choose the firms
with the lowest costs as the winners. Since type c never wins the auction, its expected
payment in the discriminatory and the uniform-price auction is zero. In order to
be sure that individual rationality is fulfilled also in the all-pay auction, we consider
only the equilibrium where type c bids zero. Hence, given an announcement rule I ,
all three auctions are equivalent to an incentive compatible direct mechanism 〈mˆ , I 〉
with mˆ (c ) = 0. Incentive compatibility implies (IC1) such that we have mˆ (c ) =m (c ).
Together with (IC2) this is also sufficient for incentive compatibility. The expected
payments by the firms and therefore also the expected revenue for the auctioneer are
the same in all three auctions. Expected payment of type c has to equal m (c ) in all
three auction formats, i.e.
m (c ) = βA(c ) = (1−Gk (c ))βD(c ) =
∫ c
c
βU (y )g k (y )d c .
This can be rearranged to yield (10). With beliefs (8), all three auctions are individu-
ally rational.
There are a few things worth noting concerning the uniqueness of equilibrium
strategies. First, since losers do not pay anything in the discriminatory and uniform-
price auction, we must have mˆ (c ) = 0 in those two cases. Hence, the incentive com-
patible mˆ and therefore also the strictly decreasing equilibrium strategies βD and
βU are unique. Furthermore, under beliefs (8) the discriminatory and uniform-price
auction are individually rational. On the other hand, for the all-pay auction, mˆ (c )
is not necessarily zero and hence the equilibrium strategy is not unique. Yet with
out-of-equilibriumbeliefs (8), βA defined in Proposition 1 corresponds to the unique
individually rational equilibrium with a strictly decreasing strategy.
According to Proposition 1, two conditions have to be fulfilled in order for a sep-
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arating equilibrium to exist for a specific auction format. First, (IC2) must hold to
ensure incentive compatibility of the corresponding direct mechanism. Second, the
equilibrium bidding strategy needs to be strictly decreasing so that types can be in-
ferred from bids. While the first condition is, of course, the same for all auction for-
mats, the second condition differs.
Corollary 1. Given the same announcement rule is used in all three auction formats,
β ′
U
(c )< 0 ⇒ β ′
D
(c )< 0 ⇒ β ′
A
(c )< 0.
Consequently, if the uniform-price auction has a separating equilibrium, the same is
true for the discriminatory auction which in turn implies that the all-pay auction has
a separating equilibrium.
Proof. Note that βD(c ) =
∫ c
c
βU (z k )g k (z k )d z k
1−Gk (c )
= E

βU (Zk ) |Zk > c

. Therefore β ′
U
(c ) < 0
implies β ′
D
(c )< 0. Since d
d c
(1−Gk (c ))< 0, β
′
D
(c )< 0 implies β ′
A
(c )< 0.
This very useful result suggests that there can, e.g., be situations where the all-
pay auction has a separating equilibriumwhile the other two auction formats do not.
Since βD(c ) = E

βU (Zk ) |Zk > c

, the discriminatory and the uniform-price auction
are closely related. Note, however, that β ′
D
(c ) < 0 does not imply β ′
U
(c ) < 0 so that
existence of a separating equilibrium in the uniform-price auction does not follow
from existence of a separating equilibrium in the discriminatory auction.
3.3 Announcement Rules
So far, we have not specified what rule the auctioneer follows when announcing a
subset of the bids. We have just assumed this announcement to affect the firms’
beliefs through revealing information I about cost parameters which we have de-
scribed by an announcement rule I for the corresponding direct mechanism. Of
course, there are many possibilities when choosing a bid announcement policy. In
the following, we focus on the cases where either all bids are revealed or where the
amount each bidder must pay is announced. For the auction formats we examine,
this corresponds to three different announcement rules I .
Suppose the auctioneer publicly reveals all bids so that, in a separating equilib-
rium, the cost parameters of all firms become commonly known. We denote this
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announcement rule by I ab . Beliefs hence simply become
ξab (x ,z) = x and ζab (x ,z) = z, (11)
so that firms act under complete information in the second stage.
Let us turn to the case where the prices paid by the bidders become publicly
known after the auction. Of course, this makes no difference for the all-pay auc-
tion. For the discriminatory auction, however, revealing the prices paid means that
the auctioneer announces the winning bids only. In a separating equilibrium with
decreasing bidding strategies, the k lowest costs become common knowledge which
we denote by I wb . Concerning the rest of the cost parameters firmsmerely know that
they are higher than the k th lowest cost parameter. Thus, beliefs are
ξwb (x ,z) =
(
x for x < z k
E [C i |C i > z k ] for x > z k
(12)
and
ζwb (x ,z) =



E [Z |Z1 = z 1,Z2 = z 2, ...,Zk−1 = z k−1] for x < z k−1
E [Z |Z1 = z 1,Z2 = z 2, ...,Zk−1 = z k−1,Zk > x ] for z k−1 < x < z k
E [Z |Z1 = z 1,Z2 = z 2, ...,Zk = z k ] for x > z k .
(13)
Revealing the prices paid in a uniform-price auction corresponds to the an-
nouncement rule where only the highest losing bid is revealed. Consequently, in
an equilibrium in decreasing strategies, only the (k +1)th lowest cost parameter be-
comes publicly known which we denote by I hl b . Recalling we assumed that firms all
know the identities of the winners, we obtain for the beliefs under rule I hl b
ξhl b (x ,z) =



E [C i |C i < z k ] for x < z k
x for z k < x < z k+1
E [C i |C i > z k+1] for x > z k+1
(14)
and
ζhl b (x ,z) =



E [Z |Zk = z k ] for x < z k
E [Z |Zk < x <Zk+1] for z k < x < z k+1
E [Z |Zk+1 = z k+1] for x > z k+1.
(15)
The three announcement rules we have just defined all have a fundamental prop-
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erty in common: the revealed reports alone would allow a firm to determine whether
it belongs to thewinners or the losers of the auction.8 Most importantly, this property
implies that beliefs are independent of any private information. Hence, two firms i
and j will hold exactly the same beliefs concerning the costs ch for all h 6= i , j when
they enter the second stage. One reason why we restrict our analysis to announce-
ment rules that exhibit this property is that it allows for a closed form solution to our
model of the second stage we present in Section 4. As an example where this prop-
erty does not hold, consider the situation that arises when the auctioneer does not
announce any bids at all. Of course, also in this case, we would still want to assume
that each firm learns whether it has won access to the new technology. If the truth-
telling firm i has won (lost), it will form beliefs about its competitors conditional on
Zk > c i (Zk < c i ). Therefore, firms will hold differing beliefs about their competitors,
as for each firm i beliefs ξi and ζi depend on its privately known cost parameter c i .
3.4 The Signaling Effect
In order to analyze how signaling affects the equilibrium behavior of firms, it is use-
ful to compare our results to the case where signaling is not possible. Suppose, as a
benchmark case, that all cost parameters are directly revealed to firms at the begin-
ning of the second stage. In this case, the type x firm i might pretend to be has no
effect on ΠW and ΠL . Using (9), the expected payment by a firm in this benchmark
case simplifies to
mb (c ) :=
∫ c
c

ΠW (y ,y ,y )−ΠL(y ,y ,y )

g k (y )d y .
This allows us to decompose the expected payment into a non-signaling and a sig-
naling part, i.e.,
m (c ) =mb (c )+m s (c )
where the signaling component is given by
m s (c ) :=−
∫ c
c
∫ c
y
ΠW ′
2
(y ,y ,z k )g k (z k )d z kd y −
∫ c
c
∫ y
c
ΠL′
2
(y ,y ,z k )g k (z k )d z kd y .
8This is the case if at least either the k th or the (k +1)th lowest cost parameter becomes publicly
known.
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Whilemb (c ) is clearly positive, the sign of the signaling effectm s (c ) depends on the
model of the second stage. Depending on the kind of interaction among firms after
the auction, signaling might increase or decrease bids and expected payments. Note
that we will drop the superscripts W and L in the following. The direction of the
signaling effect depends, of course, on the sign of
Π′
2
(c ,x ,z k ) = E

∂
∂ x
π(c ,ξ(x ,Z),ζ(x ,Z)) |Zk = z k

,
i.e., on the sign of
∂
∂ x
π(c ,ξ(x ,z),ζ(x ,z)) =
∂ π(c ,ξ,ζ)
∂ ξ
∂ ξ(x ,z)
∂ x
+
n−1∑
j=1
∂ π(c ,ξ,ζ)
∂ ζj
∂ ζj (x ,z)
∂ x
.
Hence, there are two effects through which signaling has an impact on firm i ’s be-
havior. The first effect stems from the way firm i wants to be perceived by its com-
petitors, i.e.
∂ π(c ,ξ,ζ)
∂ ξ
. The second effect is due to
∂ π(c ,ξ,ζ)
∂ ζj
, the influence of the expected
cost parameters of firm i ’s competitors on expected profits. The strength of those
effects depends on how the signal firm i sends is reflected in the beliefs, i.e., on the
announcement rule.
As we have seen in Subsection 3.3, if the auctioneer announces all bids, we have
∂ ξ(x ,z)
∂ x
= 1 and
∂ ζj (x ,z)
∂ x
= 0 for all j . In this case, there is only the first effect. If
∂ π(c ,ξ,ζ)
∂ ξ
>
0, as, e.g., in a Bertrand oligopoly, firm i prefers to be thought of as having high costs.
The signaling effect therefore reduces bids and expected payments of firms. On the
other hand, if
∂ π(c ,ξ,ζ)
∂ ξ
< 0, as, e.g., in a Cournot oligopoly, firm i wants to pretend to
have lower costs than it actually has, such that the signaling effect increases bids and
payments.
Looking at the other two announcement rules we consider in Subsection 3.3, we
find that in both cases
∂ ξ(x ,z)
∂ x
> 0 and, for some j ,
∂ ζj (x ,z)
∂ x
> 0 for a certain range of x . If
firm i ’s bid is actually announced by the auctioneer, this will not only affect ξ but also
ζ. Consider, e.g., a discriminatory auction with the winning bids being announced.
In the event that firm i pretending to be of type x just wins with the k th highest bid,
it will be generally believed that the losers must have cost parameters higher than x .
This is how the second effect comes into play. Its direction depends on how i ’s profit
depends on the cost parameters of i ’s competitors. If
∂ π(c ,ξ,ζ)
∂ ζj
> 0, as in an oligopoly
market where goods are substitutes, the second effect reduces bids and payments.
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By contrast, if
∂ π(c ,ξ,ζ)
∂ ζj
< 0, as in an oligopoly with firms producing complements,
bids and payments are increased.
3.5 Relation to the Literature
Before moving on to the next section where we develop our model for the market
interaction in the second stage, let us digress for a moment in order to demonstrate
how our framework accommodates several interesting examples from the literature.
3.5.1 Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2008)
Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2008) construct a model where n firms with privately
knownmarginal costs c i bid in an auction in order to win access to a duopoly with an
incumbent monopolist. Hence, in our framework, we have k = 1 and πL(c ,ξ,ζ) = 0.
Moreover, the winner’s expected duopoly profit is independent of the other bidders’
types, i.e. πW (c ,ξ,ζ) = π˜(c ,ξ). The authors compare a first-price and second-price
auction where the winner’s bid is revealed to an English auction where the second
highest bid is revealed. In our terminology the equilibrium of these auctions corre-
sponds to the strategies βwb
D
, βwb
U
, and βhl b
U
.
Note that when the winning bid is announced, we have ΠW (c ,x ,z 1) = π˜(c ,x ) if
x < z 1. Therefore, (IC1) simplifies to
mˆ (c ) = mˆ (c )+
∫ c
c
π˜(y ,y )g 1(y )d y −
∫ c
c
∫ c
y
π˜′
2
(y ,y )g 1(z 1)d z 1d y
= mˆ (c ∗)+
∫ c ∗
c
¦
π˜(y ,y )g 1(y )− πˆ
′
2
(y ,y )
 
1−G1(y )
©
d y
where c ∗ ∈
 
c ,c

. Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2008) endogenize bidder participa-
tion where c ∗ is the highest cost type that participates. With mˆ (c ∗) = 0 instead of
mˆ (c ) = 0 we can apply Proposition 1 in order to find
βwb
U
(c ) = π˜(c ,c )− π˜′
2
(c ,c )
1−G1(c )
g 1(c )
.
Since 1−G1(z 1) = (1− F (z 1))
n−1, this is exactly the second-price auction equilibrium
Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2008) find (Theorem 3, p. 68). Their first-price auction
equilibrium can be obtained in a very similar way.
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With the second highest bid revealed we have ΠW (c ,x ,z 1) = π˜(c ,E [C i |C i < z 1]) if
x < z 1. Therefore,
βhl b
U
(c ) = π˜(c ,E [C i |C i < c ])
which corresponds exactly to the English auction equilibrium strategy Katzman and
Rhodes-Kropf (2008) find (see Theorem 4 on p. 70).
3.5.2 Das Varma (2003) and Goeree (2003)
Both Das Varma (2003) and Goeree (2003) study bidding in a first-price auction
through which single access (k = 1) to a cost reducing innovation is sold. Follow-
ing the auction, the winning bid is disclosed. Bidding in this auction are n firms that
compete in a market afterwards. All firms have constant marginal costs s . If firm i
wins the auction, its marginal costs are reduced by θ i . θ i is private information and
drawn from F˜ on

θ ,θ

, whereas all other parameters of the model are commonly
known.
Let c i := s−θ i and, accordingly, F (c ) := 1−F˜ (s−c ). Since only the type of thewin-
ner is relevant for the second stage, we have πW (c ,ξ,ζ) = π˜W (c ,ξ) and πL(c ,ξ,ζ) =
π˜L(ζ1). The winning bid being revealed in turn implies Π
W (c ,x ,z 1) = π˜
W (c ,x ) as well
as ΠL(c ,x ,z 1) = π˜
L(z 1). From Proposition 1 we have
βwb
D
(c ) =
1
1−G1(c )
∫ c
c
¦
π˜W (y ,y )− π˜L(y )

g 1(y )− π˜
W ′
2
(y ,y )
 
1−G1(y )
©
d y .
Using the fact that 1−G1(c ) = F˜ (s − c )n−1 and performing a change of variable we
obtain
βwb
D
(θ ) =
∫ θ
θ
(
π˜W (s − t ,s − t )− π˜L(s − t )
−π˜W ′
2
(s − t ,s − t )
F˜ (t )
(n −1) f˜ (t )
«
(n −1) F˜ (t )n−2 f˜ (t )
F˜ (θ )n−1
d t .
Taking their slightly different definition of π˜W and π˜L into account, this is exactly the
first-price auction equilibrium Das Varma (2003) and Goeree (2003) find (see Propo-
sition 2 on p. 28 and Proposition 4 on p. 356, respectively).
In addition, Goeree (2003) also looks at two other auction formats. While his
second-price auction fits our framework very well, the English auction he consid-
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ers does not. The reason for this is that Goeree (2003), in contrast to Katzman and
Rhodes-Kropf (2008), assumes the winning bid of the English auction to be revealed
which induces the equilibrium strategy to differ from the ones we consider in Propo-
sition 1.
3.5.3 Ziv (1993)
Ziv (1993) analyzes a model of n = 2 firms with privately known marginal costs c i
and c j competing in a Cournot duopoly. Before playing the Cournot game both firms
signal their type through publicly burningmoney. In our framework this corresponds
to the all-pay auction with all bids revealed. Furthermore, we have πW (c i ,ξ
ab ,ζab ) =
πL(c i ,ξ
ab ,ζab ) =π(c i ,x ,c j ) such that
β ab
A
(c i ) =−
∫ c
c i
E

π′
2
(y ,y ,C j )

d y
which corresponds to the equilibrium strategy (13) in Ziv (1993) when substituting
the Cournot profit for π and engaging in some rearranging.
An additional example that fits our framework is the simultaneous auction model
of Katsenos (2008) where k = 2 licenses granting access to an oligopoly market are
sold to n > 2 firms through a discriminatory auction. With the winning bids being
revealed, firms are using the auction to signal about their privately known marginal
costs.
Apart from Ziv (1993), in all the models we have discussed above only the pri-
vate information of the winners of the auction is relevant for the second stage. Of
course, in Ziv (1993) all private information is relevant, but since nothing can be
won in the auction there is no distinction between winners and losers. In contrast
to that, our model exhibits both of these features: all private information is relevant
and the auction stage is used to sell objects with an actual intrinsic value. More-
over, our framework allows for analyzing multi-object auctions, whereas Katzman
and Rhodes-Kropf (2008), Das Varma (2003), and Goeree (2003) focus on k = 1.
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4 The Second Stage
After having kept the second stage quite general when developing the framework for
the auction stage, we now describe a specificmodel of themarket competition in the
second stage. Having explicit solutions for πW and πL at hand enables us to explore
under what circumstances separating equilibria arise in auctions among competi-
tors.
The production technology of the firms exhibits constant marginal costs and no
fixed costs. Marginal costs differ among firms and are private information. For firm i ,
marginal costs are described by the cost parameter c i . The technological innovation
sold through the auction reduces marginal costs by a constant amount ǫ.
We will consider two forms of competition: either firms choose quantities simul-
taneously (Cournot competition) or they set prices simultaneously (Bertrand com-
petition). In both cases each firm faces a linear demand for its product. The inverse
demand is given by
p i = a −qi −d
∑
j 6=i
qj (16)
where d ∈ (0,1] and where p i and qi denote the price and the quantity of firm i ’s
product. The parameter d captures the degree of differentiation between the prod-
ucts of the firms. In particular, if d = 1, firms all produce a homogeneous good and if
d → 0, all firms would becomemonopolists. We generally assume
a > a˜ := c +(n −1)
 
c − c + ǫ

. (17)
Moreover, in the case of Bertrand competition wemake the additional assumption
d <
2a − c
2a − c + a˜
. (18)
These restrictions onparameters guarantee that all firmswill supply a strictly positive
quantity of their product in the second stage, regardless of the realization ofmarginal
costs and of the allocation of the cost reducing technology.
Consider first a situation where no firm has access to the cost reducing technol-
ogy. Furthermore, assume that firms all have learned the same information I about
the realization of all marginal costs. In the case of Cournot competition, each firm
i chooses its production quantity qi in order to maximize its expected profits. Let
qi :

c ,c

→R+ denote the equilibrium strategy of firm i . In the Bayesian Nash equi-
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librium wemust have
qi (c i ) = argmax
q
a −q −d∑
j 6=i
E [qj (C j ) |I ]− c i
q ∀i and c i ∈ c ,c . (19)
Solving for this equilibrium, we can derive firm i ’s expected profit when there are no
cost reductions. Now, suppose that k of the firms have in the first stage gained access
to the new technology which simply means that the marginal costs of k out of the
n firms are reduced by the commonly known amount ǫ. Distinguishing between a
firm i that has won and a firm i that has lost in the first stage and adapting the above
result for the case without cost reductions accordingly, we readily obtain the profit
firm i expects to earn in the second stage.9
Lemma 3. Under Cournot competition the expected profit of firm i that has won and
lost the auction, respectively, is
πW (c i ,ξ
i ,ζi ) =
γ0+γ1 n−1∑
j=1
ζi
j
−γ2ξ
i −
1
2
c i +

1
2
+γ2− (k −1)γ1

ǫ

2
and
πL(c i ,ξ
i ,ζi ) =
γ0+γ1 n−1∑
j=1
ζi
j
−γ2ξ
i −
1
2
c i −kγ1ǫ

2
where γ0 :=
(4−2d )a
2(4−d 2(n−1)+2d (n−2))
, γ1 :=
2d
2(4−d 2(n−1)+2d (n−2))
, and γ2 :=
d 2(n−1)
2(4−d 2(n−1)+2d (n−2))
.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
A property of expected profits important for our analysis is of course the signaling
incentive it provides for a firm. Since πt ′2 (c ,ξ,ζ) = −2γ2
p
πt (c ,ξ,ζ) < 0 for t =W,L,
a firm would like to pretend to be stronger than it actually is. That way, this firm
can induce its competitors to supply a lower quantity and therefore obtain a higher
market share.
Let us turn to the case of Bertrand competition. Here, each firm chooses the price
p i of its product in order to maximize its expected profit. LetQ i

p i ,
∑
j 6=i
p j

denote
the demand for the product of firm i that corresponds to the inverse demand (16).
9For two firms with ǫ = 0 and d = 1, this result is identical to (4) in Ziv (1993).
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Again, consider first the case without the cost reducing technology. Denoting firm i ’s
equilibrium strategy by p i :

c ,c

→R+, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium requires
p i (c i ) = argmax
p
§
E

Q i

p ,
∑
j 6=i
p j (C j )
I −pª p − c i ∀i and c i ∈ c ,c . (20)
Returning to the situation where k firms have their marginal costs reduced by ǫ, this
implies the following for the expected profit of firm i .
Lemma 4. Under Bertrand competition the expected profit of firm i that has won and
lost the auction, respectively, is
πW (c i ,ξ
i ,ζi ) =
δ0+δ1 n−1∑
j=1
ζi
j
+δ2ξ
i −
1
2
c i +

1
2
−δ2− (k −1)δ1

ǫ

2
and
πL(c i ,ξ
i ,ζi ) =
δ0+δ1 n−1∑
j=1
ζi
j
+δ2ξ
i −
1
2
c i −kδ1ǫ

2
where δ0 :=
(1−d )a
2(1−d )+d (n−1)
, δ1 :=
2d (1−2d+dn )
2(2−3d+2dn )(2−3d+dn )
, and δ2 :=
d 2(n−1)
2(2−3d+2dn )(2−3d+dn )
.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Comparing Lemmata 3 and 4, we find the structure of expected profits to be very
similar. The crucial difference lies in the signaling incentive. In the Bertrand market,
as πt ′2 (c ,ξ,ζ) = 2δ2
p
πt (c ,ξ,ζ)> 0 for t =W,L, a firm prefers to appear weaker than
it is, so that its competitors set higher prices leaving a higher market share for the
firm in question.
5 Revealing All Bids
Having presented our model for the second stage in the preceding section, we are
now ready to study the full model. We begin, in this section, with the case where the
auctioneer announces all bids at the end of the first stage. In the subsequent section
we will then turn to the situation where the amount to be paid by each bidder is
revealed.
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Suppose the auctioneer reveals all bids after the auction, so that firms will, in
equilibrium, have full information about all cost parameters when they enter the sec-
ond stage. Consequently, with firms holding beliefs ξab and ζab defined in (11), we
have
Πt (c ,x ,z k ) = E

πt (c ,x ,Z) |Zk = z k

for t =W,L. (21)
Using Lemmata 3 and 4 together with Lemma 1, we find the following.
Proposition 2. Under Cournot competition, the direct mechanism


m , I ab

is incen-
tive compatible. Under Bertrand competition,


m , I ab

is incentive compatible if and
only if n = 2 and

1
2
−δ2+δ1

ǫ f (c )−δ2 ≥ 0 for all c ∈

c ,c

. (22)
Proof. Under Cournot competition, we have
ΠW ′
1
(c ,x ,x )−ΠL′
1
(c ,x ,x ) = E

πW ′
1
(c ,x ,Z)−πL′
1
(c ,x ,Z) |Zk = x

=−

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ
and
Πt ′′
12
(c ,x ,z k ) = γ2 for t =W,L.
(IC2) therefore simplifies to

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫg k (x )+γ2 ≥ 0 (23)
implying that the direct mechanism with expected payment m defined by (9) is in-
centive compatible.
For the case of Bertrand competition, we can simply use (23) and replace γ1 by δ1
and γ2 by −δ2. Hence, we obtain
U ′′
12
(c ,x ) =

1
2
−δ2+δ1

ǫg k (x )−δ2.
Now note that, g k (c ) = 0 for k > 1 and g k (c ) = 0 for k < n −1. Consequently, if n > 2,
there are always some c close enough to c or c (or both) for whichU ′′
12
(c ,c ) is strictly
negative. Hence, n = 2 is necessary for the direct mechanism to be incentive com-
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patible. Incentive compatibility thus requires (22). AsU ′′
12
(c ,x )≥ 0 ∀c ,x is equivalent
toU ′′
12
(c ,c )≥ 0 ∀c , (22) and n = 2 are also sufficient for incentive compatibility.
Intuitively, in auctions where the highest bidders win and without signaling pos-
sibilities, we would expect the firms with the lowest costs to bid the highest amount
since ∂
∂ c

πW (c ,ξ,ζ)−πL(c ,ξ,ζ)

< 0 for both the Cournot and the Bertrand model.
Taking signaling into account, firms want to appear stronger under Cournot com-
petition where π′
2
(c ,ξ,ζ) < 0, while they pretend to have high costs in the Bertrand
case because of π′
2
(c ,ξ,ζ)> 0. Since under Cournot (Bertrand) competition we have
π′′
12
(c ,ξ,ζ) > 0 (π′′
12
(c ,ξ,ζ) < 0), the signaling incentive is in both cases strongest
for the low-cost types. In the Cournot case, the signaling effect thus goes into the
same direction as the first effect: low-cost firms increase their already higher bids
by more than high-cost firms. Under Bertrand competition, however, the signaling
effect works into the opposite direction. Firms with low costs reduce their bids by
more than firms with high costs, so that it becomes unclear which types will submit
the highest bids. As Proposition 2 shows, for n > 2 the two opposing effects prevent
incentive compatiblemechanisms that choose firmswith the lowest costs as winners
from existing. In addition, the following corollary shows that separating equilibria
are, in fact, impossible for all auctions where the highest bidders win.
Corollary 2. Consider auctions where the highest bidders win and all bids are re-
vealed. For Bertrand competition and n > 2, there does not exist any auction mecha-
nism that has a separating equilibrium.
Proof. In a separating equilibrium, firms are able to directly infer types from bids.
Hence, (continuous) equilibriumbidding strategies have to be either strictly decreas-
ing or strictly increasing. For strictly decreasing strategies, the corresponding direct
mechanism is


m , I ab

. Under Bertrand competition and n > 2, Proposition 2 shows
that


m , I ab

can never be incentive compatible. For strictly increasing strategies the
corresponding direct mechanism is similar to


m , I ab

but with the allocation rule
choosing the firms with the highest costs as winners. Note that in terms of firm i ’s
objective (4), the difference between


m , I ab

and this alternative direct mechanism
is just thatW and L are interchanged and k is replaced by n−k . With those changes,
Lemma 1 continues to hold. Accordingly, the direct mechanism choosing the firms
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with the highest costs as winners is incentive compatible only if
−

ΠL′
1
(c ,c ,c )−ΠW ′
1
(c ,c ,c )

g n−k (c )
+
∫ c
c
ΠL′′
12
(c ,c ,z n−k )g n−k (z n−k )d z n−k +
∫ c
c
ΠW ′′
12
(c ,c ,z n−k )g n−k (z n−k )d z n−k ≥ 0.
Under Bertrand competition, this simplifies to
−

1
2
−δ2+δ1

ǫg n−k (c )−δ2 ≥ 0
which is clearly violated.
As under Bertrand competition separating equilibria might only exist as a special
case, we will focus on Cournot competition for the rest of this section. For the three
auction formats we have introduced in Subsection 3.2 equilibrium bidding strategies
are given in Proposition 1. FromProposition 2we know that the corresponding direct
mechanism is incentive compatible under Cournot competition. In order to make
sure that such a separating equilibrium actually exists for each auction, we are left to
verify that equilibrium strategies βA , βD , and βU are strictly decreasing in c .
As we show below expected paymentm (c ) is strictly decreasing in c under Cour-
not competition. With each firm having to pay its bid, the all-pay auction therefore
has a separating equilibrium. In a discriminatory or a uniform-price auction, losers
are not asked to pay anything. But with all bids being announced, the losers’ bids still
work as a signaling device. Especially for firms with very high costs that are almost
sure that they will not be among the winners, the credibility of signals becomes ques-
tionable. Not surprisingly, existence of a separating equilibrium is ensured only in a
special case.
Proposition 3. Suppose all bids are announced and there is Cournot competition in
the second stage. Then, the all-pay auction generally has a separating equilibrium
where firms bid according toβA . For the discriminatory and the uniform-price auction
a separating equilibrium where firms bid according to βD and βU , respectively, exists
only if k = n −1. If, in addition to k = n −1, F (c ) is logconcave and F (c )n−1 is convex,
then both auction formats have such a separating equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
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According to Proposition 3, there generally is a separating equilibrium for Cour-
not competitors bidding in an all-pay auction. In the example of lobbying for sub-
sidies, firms hence increase their lobbying expenses in order to signal their strength,
given that those expenses are disclosed. The all-pay auction even has a separating
equilibrium if ǫ = 0, i.e., if there is no cost reduction for the winners. In this case,
bidding in the all-pay auction corresponds exactly to the truth-telling equilibrium of
Ziv (1993). Our result therefore extends Ziv’s finding to a Cournot market with more
than two firms and heterogeneous goods.
For the discriminatory and the uniform-price auction credible signaling leading
to a complete separation of types is only possible if there is only one loser. The reason
for this is that if k < n − 1, g k (c ) → 0 as c → c : for a firm with very high costs win-
ning probability and expected payment are virtually unchanged when such a firm
increases its bid in order to signal lower costs. Because of the incentive to deviate for
high-cost firms bids cannot serve as credible signals. Avoiding this problem by set-
ting k = n − 1 is not enough to guarantee the existence of a separating equilibrium.
Proposition 3 provides a sufficient condition requiring the distribution function F to
be logconcave but not "too concave". Of course, the credibility problemof losing bids
is mitigated if the auctioneer refrains from revealing all losing bids. As we find in the
next section, this lets separating equilibria become possible also for discriminatory
and uniform-price auctions where k < n −1.
6 Revealing the Prices Paid
The auctioneer publicly announcing the amount each firm has to pay has different
implications for the three auction formats. In the discriminatory auction the win-
ning bids are revealed, whereas in the uniform-price auction the highest losing bid
is announced. In an all-pay auction, announcing the prices to be paid is, of course,
equivalent to revealing all bids which is the topic of Section 5. Hence, we exclusively
focus in this section on the discriminatory and the uniform-price auction, treating
each of the two formats separately.
As we have seen in Section 4, a firm’s expected profits πW and πL do not actually
depend on the elements of ζ but only on their sum. In the following it is therefore
useful to define S(x ,z) :=
∑n−1
j=1
ζj (x ,z) and to write π
t (c ,ξ(x ,z),S(x ,z)) rather than
πt (c ,ξ(x ,z),ζ(x ,z)) for t =W,L.
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6.1 The Discriminatory Auction
For the discriminatory auction, revealing the prices paid is equivalent to announc-
ing all winning bids. The auction corresponds therefore to the direct mechanism

m , I wb

. Using the slightly changed notation with S instead of ζ, we have, for t =
W,L,
Πt (c ,x ,z k ) = E

πt (c ,ξwb (x ,Z),Swb (x ,Z)) |Zk = z k

with ξwb (x ,z) given in (12) and
Swb (x ,z) =



S I (z1,...,k−1) for x < z k−1
S I I (x ,z1,...,k−1) for z k−1 < x < z k
S I I I (z1,...,k ) for z k < x
where
S I (z1,...,k−1) :=
∑k−1
j=1
z j +(n −k )E [C |C > z k−1]
S I I (x ,z1,...,k−1) :=
∑k−1
j=1
z j +(n −k )E [C |C > x ]
S I I I (z1,...,k ) :=
∑k
j=1
z j +(n −k −1)E [C |C > z k ]
Note that in the case firm i belongs to the winners, i.e., i expects to receive ΠW , we
have x < z k . Similarly, for ΠL there is x > z k . Therefore,
ΠL(c ,x ,z k ) = E

πL(c ,E [C |C >Zk ],S
I I I (Z1,...,k )) |Zk = z k

and
ΠW (c ,x ,z k ) =∫ z k
x
∫ z k−1
c
. . .
∫ z k−1
z k−3
πW (c ,x ,S I (z1,...,k−1))
g 1,...,k (z1,...,k )
g k (z k )
d z k−2 . . .d z 1d z k−1
+
∫ x
c
∫ z k−1
c
. . .
∫ z k−1
z k−3
πW (c ,x ,S I I (x ,z1,...,k−1))
g 1,...,k (z1,...,k )
g k (z k )
d z k−2 . . .d z 1d z k−1
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or
ΠW (c ,x ,z k ) = Pr[x <Zk−1,Zk = z k ]E

πW (c ,x ,S I (Z1,...,k−1)) |x <Zk−1,Zk = z k

+Pr[Zk−1 < x ,Zk = z k ]E

πW (c ,x ,S I I (x ,Z1,...,k−1)) |Zk−1 < x ,Zk = z k

. (24)
Employing the results of Lemmata 3 and 4, Lemma 1 implies the following.
Proposition 4. Under Cournot competition, the direct mechanism


m , I wb

is incen-
tive compatible. Under Bertrand competition,


m , I wb

is incentive compatible if and
only if k = 1 and

1
2
−δ2+δ1

ǫ−δ2 (E [C |C > c ]− c )−δ2
1− F (c )
(n −1) f (c )
≥ 0 (25)
for all c ∈

c ,c

.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
As in the case where all bids are revealed, under Cournot competition separating
equilibria are generally possible. In addition, revealing less information opens up the
possibility of a separating equilibrium in the case where there is a single winner even
under Bertrand competition. Indeed, k = 1 corresponds to the mechanism with the
least information revealed among all direct mechanisms


m , I wb

.
In addition to the corresponding direct mechanism being incentive compatible,
the bidding strategy βD has to be strictly decreasing in order for the discriminatory
auction to have a separating equilibrium. Checking this second condition represents
our next task. At this point, we impose the additional assumption that the density f
is logconcave which enables us to obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. Suppose f is logconcave. Under Cournot competition, there exists an
a ∗ ∈R such that the discriminatory auction with the winners’ bids revealed has a sep-
arating equilibrium where firms bid according to βD if the market size a ≥ a
∗. Under
Bertrand competition and with k = 1, there is a d ∗ ∈ (0,1] so that given ǫ > 0 such a
separating equilibrium exists for all d ≤ d ∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Revealing only the winning bids in a discriminatory auction eliminates the prob-
lem of noncredible signaling through losing bids that have no costly consequences
29
for the senders. At the same time, however, an other issue arises because of what we
identified as the second signaling effect in Subsection 3.4. Consider the event that
firm i submits the lowest winning bid while pretending to have costs x . Increasing x
leads to an increase in the costs that losing firms are generally believed to have which
in turn increases i ’s expected profits. This effect therefore provides an incentive to re-
duce bids. The incentive is strongest for low-cost firms and hence increases the slope
of the bidding strategyβD . Under Cournot competition both the value of winning the
auction and the first signaling effect support a decreasing βD . According to Proposi-
tion 5, a sufficiently big market is enough to ensure that the second signaling effect
does not dominate the other two effects.10
Under Bertrand competition and k = 1, there is a separating equilibrium if the
goods are sufficiently heterogeneous, i.e., if competition among firms is not too
fierce. When the heterogeneity of goods is increased winning the auctions gains in
importance relative to the signaling incentives, such that from some point on a sep-
arating equilibrium exists. Interestingly, as we show in Appendix A.5, β ′
D
< 0 implies
that condition (25) is fulfilled. Hence, it generally cannot be the case that


m , I wb

fails to be incentive compatible although βD is strictly decreasing.
6.2 The Uniform-price Auction
In the uniform-price auction, announcing the prices winners have to paymeans that
the highest losing bid is revealed. Accordingly, again using the slightly different no-
tation with S instead of ζ, we have, for t =W,L,
Πt (c ,x ,z k ) = E

πt (c ,ξhl b (x ,Z),Shl b (x ,Z)) |Zk = z k

where ξhl b (x ,z) is given in (14) and
Shl b (x ,z) =



S I (z k ) for x < z k
S I I (x ) for z k < x < z k+1
S I I I (z k+1) for z k+1 < x .
10Note that this result for the case of Cournot competition also holds for ǫ = 0. Even if winning a
discriminatory auction with the winners’ bids revealed does not provide a direct advantage, firms still
participate, exclusively using their bids for signaling.
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with
S I (z k ) := (k −1)E [C |C < z k ]+ z k +(n −k −1)E [C |C > z k ] ,
S I I (x ) := kE [C |C < x ]+ (n −k −1)E [C |C > x ] ,
S I I I (z k+1) := kE [C |C < z k+1]+ z k+1+(n −k −2)E [C |C > z k+1] .
Note that for ΠW we have always x < z k and for ΠL there is x > z k . Therefore,
ΠW (c ,x ,z k ) =π
W (c ,E [C |C < z k ],S
I (z k ))
and
ΠL(c ,x ,z k ) =
∫ c
x
πL(c ,x ,S I I (x ))
g k ,k+1(z k ,z k+1)
g k (z k )
d z k+1
+
∫ x
z k
πL(c ,E [C |C > z k+1],S
I I I (z k+1))
g k ,k+1(z k ,z k+1)
g k (z k )
d z k+1.
Combining Lemmata 3 and 4 with Lemma 1 one more time, we find the following.
Proposition 6. Under Cournot competition, the direct mechanism


m , I hl b

is incen-
tive compatible. Under Bertrand competition,


m , I hl b

is incentive compatible if and
only if

1
2
−δ2+δ1

ǫ−δ2 (c − E [C |C < c ])
−δ2 (E [C |C > c ]− c )
n −k −1
k
F (c )
1− F (c )
−δ2
F (c )
k f (c )
≥ 0 (26)
for all c ∈

c ,c

.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Like for the other two announcement rules, the corresponding direct mecha-
nism continues to be incentive compatible under Cournot competitionwhen just the
highest losing bid of the auction is revealed. Under Bertrand competition, revealing
only one cost parameter confines the signaling effect enough for the corresponding
direct mechanism to become incentive compatible for all k and n , given condition
(26) holds.
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Figure 1: Existence of a separating equilibrium for the uniform-price auction under
Cournot competition with uniformly distributed costs.
In order for a separating equilibrium to exist for the uniform-price auction with
the highest losing bid revealed, the corresponding equilibrium bidding strategy
must, of course, be a strictly decreasing function. As the one bid that is announced
does not directly involve any costs to the submitting bidder, the problem of noncred-
ible signals is also present in this auction, although its impact is less grave than when
all bids are revealed.
Proposition 7. Suppose ǫ > 0. Then, under both Cournot and Bertrand competition,
there exists a d ∗ ∈ (0,1] such that for all d ≤ d ∗ the uniform-price auction with the
highest losing bid revealed has a separating equilibrium where firms bid according to
βU .
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
For both types of competition, incentives stemming from the possibility of us-
ing bids as signals might prevent a complete separation of types. For sufficiently
heterogenous goods, however, the benefit from winning the cost reduction domi-
nates those counteractive effects, such that there is a separating equilibrium for the
uniform-price auction under both Cournot as well as Bertrand competition.
As an example, suppose there are n = 6 firms with marginal costs that are uni-
formly distributed on [1,2]. Moreover, let a = 12 and either k = 1 or k = 5. For the
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1
k = 1
β′ < 0
ε
k = 5
d
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k = 5
k = 1
Figure 2: Existence of a separating equilibrium for the uniform-price auction under
Bertrand competition with uniformly distributed costs.
case of Cournot competition Figure 1 displays the combinations of the remaining
free parameters d and ǫ that allow for a separating equilibrium. At all points that
lie to the left of the solid line corresponding to k = 1 and k = 5, respectively, we
have β ′
U
(c )< 0 implying that the uniform-price auction has a separating equilibrium
where firms bid according to βU . The dotted lines represent an increase of the mar-
ket size to a = 16. Observe that increasing the number of winners enlarges the set
of points supporting a separating equilibrium, whereas increasing the market sizes
reduces this set.
Figure 2 illustrates the example under Bertrand competition. Here, points where
β ′
U
(c ) < 0 again have to lie to the left of the solid lines. In addition, for a separating
equilibrium to exist, condition (26) must be met which is the case for points above
(and left of) the dashed lines. Recall that for the case of Bertrand competition we
have made the additional assumption (18). Points in the d -ǫ-plane consistent with
this assumption lie to the left of the dash-dotted line. Interestingly, for this uniform
example, assumption (18) is sufficient to ensure β ′
U
(c ) < 0. The dotted lines again
represent the situationwhen a = 16. Increasing themarket size relaxes the restriction
on parameters because of assumption (18) whereas it leaves the requirement for the
corresponding direct mechanism to be incentive compatible unchanged.
Under Cournot and under Bertrand competition, existence of the separating
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equilibrium requires competition among firms to be not too fierce. This can also be
formulated as the need for a large enough cost reduction ǫ. Both, decreasing d and
increasing ǫ, let the advantage for a firm when winning the auction increase com-
pared to the signaling incentives.
7 Conclusion
We study the behavior of bidders in an auction who, after the auction, form an oligo-
poly and compete to sell their products. Bidders are firms that have private infor-
mation about their cost structure and take part in the auction in order to win a cost
reducing technology. As bids may be observed in the auction process, they can also
be used to send signals. We examine three different auction formats. Given the same
announcement policy is applied, in a separating equilibrium all three formats are
revenue equivalent. However, whether a separating equilibrium actually exists de-
pends among other things also on which type of auction is used.
Under Cournot competition, the all-pay auction with all bids revealed and the
discriminatory auction with the winning bids revealed both have a fully separating
equilibrium, the sole restriction in the latter auction format being that the market
size has to be big enough (assuming the probability density is logconcave). The rea-
son for a complete separation of types to arise very generally in those cases is that
the firms whose signals are actually observed by their rivals are exactly the firms that
have to pay their bid. This way, bids can serve as credible signals. In the uniform-
price auction where the price winners have to pay is announced, i.e., where the high-
est losing bid is revealed, the single firm that actually sends a signal, does not pay
anything. In this case, as an additional condition, the benefit from winning the auc-
tion has to be sufficiently high (relative to the benefit from signaling) in order for a
separating equilibrium to arise. If all bids of a discriminatory or a uniform-price auc-
tion are revealed, the problem of noncredible signals becomes more grave, so that
separating equilibria only exist in the special case where the auction has only one
loser.
Bertrand competition in the second stage constitutes an additional obstacle for
the existence of a separating equilibrium. Here, the low-cost firms that profit most
fromwinning the cost reduction are at the same time also the firmswith the strongest
signaling incentive to reduce their bids in order to understate their costs. Conse-
quently, if all bids are disclosed, separating equilibria are generally impossible when
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there are more than two firms involved. Revealing less information reduces the
weight of the signaling incentive and opens up the possibility of a separating equilib-
rium under Bertrand competition. If there is only one winner in the discriminatory
auction (i.e., if it is a first-price auction) and if only this winning bid is revealed, then
a separating equilibriummight exist. The same is true for all uniform-price auctions
where only the highest losing bid is revealed. In both cases, it is important that the
incentive to win the auction because of its intrinsic value outweighs the counterac-
tive signaling effect. This is generally the case if competition among firms is, thanks
to product differentiation, not too fierce, or, alternatively, if the cost reduction is rel-
atively big.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The first order condition to (19) yields
qi (c i ) =
1
2
a −d∑
j 6=i
E [qj (C j ) |I ]− c i
 . (A1)
Taking expectations and summing over all i 6= h we obtain
∑
i 6=h
E [qi (C i ) |I ] =
1
2
(n −1)a −d∑
i 6=h
∑
j 6=i
E [qj (C j ) |I ]−
∑
i 6=h
E [C i |I ]

which is equivalent to
∑
i 6=h
E [qi (C i ) |I ] =
1
2
(n −1)a − (n −2)d∑
j 6=h
E [qj (C j ) |I ]
− (n −1)d E [qh(Ch) |I ]−
∑
i 6=h
E [C i |I ]

 .
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After substituting expectations of (A1) for E [qh(Ch) |I ] this can be rearranged to
∑
j 6=i
E [qj (C j ) |I ] = 4γ
2−d
2
(n −1)a −
∑
j 6=i
E [C j |I ]+ (n −1)
d
2
E [C i |I ]
 (A2)
where γ := 1
2(4−d 2(n−1)+2d (n−2))
> 0. Substituting (A2) into (A1) and making some fur-
ther rearrangements we finally obtain the quantity firm i chooses in equilibrium:
qi (c i ) = (4−2d )γa +2dγ
∑
j 6=i
E [C j |I ]−d
2 (n −1)γE [C i |I ]−
1
2
c i .
Let γ0 := (4−2d )γa , γ1 := 2dγ, and γ2 := d
2 (n −1)γ. Recall that E [C i |I ] = ξ
i and
note
∑
j 6=i
E [C j |I ] =
∑n−1
j=1
E [Z j |I ] =
∑n−1
j=1
ζi
j
. Thus, the expected profit of firm i in
the second stage amounts to
π(c i ,ξ
i ,ζi ) =q (c i )
2 =
γ0+γ1 n−1∑
j=1
ζi
j
−γ2ξ
i −
1
2
c i

2
. (A3)
In case firm i belongs to the winners of the auction its marginal costs are reduced
by ǫ, i.e., we have to replace ξi and c i by ξ
i − ǫ and c i − ǫ. In this case also k − 1 of
i ’s competitors have access to the new technology such that
∑n−1
j=1
ζi
j
is reduced by
(k −1)ǫ. On the other hand, if firm i does not win, k of its competitors use the new
technology. Accordingly, we simply replace
∑n−1
j=1
ζi
j
by
∑n−1
j=1
ζi
j
−kǫ.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Summing the inverse demand (16) over all i 6= h and rearranging we obtain
∑
i 6=h
p i = (n −1)a −d (n −1)qh − (d (n −2)+1)
∑
i 6=h
qi .
Substituting this result into (16) and solving for qi yields the demand for the good
produced by firm i :
qi =
1−d
(1−d )(1+d (n−1))
a + d
(1−d )(1+d (n−1))
∑
j 6=i
p j −
1−d+d (n−1)
(1−d )(1+d (n−1))
p i .
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When we substitute the above result forQ i

p i ,
∑
j 6=i
p j

, (20) becomes
p i (c i ) = argmax
p i
 1−d1−d+d (n−1)a + d1−d+d (n−1)∑
j 6=i
E [p j (C j ) |I ]−p i
 p i − c i  .
The first order condition yields
p i (c i ) =α+λ
∑
j 6=i
E [p j (C j ) |I ]+
1
2
c i (A4)
where α := 1−d
2(1−d+d (n−1))
a and λ := d
2(1−d+d (n−1))
. Taking expectations and summing
over all i 6= h gives
∑
i 6=h
E [p i (C i ) |I ] = (n −1)α+λ (n −1)E [ph(Ch) |I ]
+λ (n −2)
∑
i 6=h
E [p i (C i ) |I ]+
1
2
∑
i 6=h
E [C i |I ].
Substituting for E [ph(Ch)|I ] and then using the result for
∑
i 6=h
E [p i (C i )|I ] together
with (A4) we obtain after some rearranging the price firm i sets in equilibrium:
p i (c i ) =
1
1−λ (n −1)
α+
λ
2 (1+λ) (1−λ (n −1))
∑
j 6=i
E [C j |I ]
+
λ2 (n −1)
2 (1+λ) (1−λ (n −1))
E [C i |I ]+
1
2
c i .
Let δ0 :=
1
1−λ(n−1)
α, δ1 :=
λ
2(1+λ)(1−λ(n−1))
, and δ2 :=
λ2(n−1)
2(1+λ)(1−λ(n−1))
. Again, recall that
E [C i |I ] = ξ
i and
∑
j 6=i
E [C j |I ] =
∑n−1
j=1
ζi
j
. For the expected profits of firm i we have
π(c i ,ξ
i ,ζi ) =
 
p i (c i )− c i
2
=
δ0+δ1 n−1∑
j=1
ζi
j
+δ2ξ
i −
1
2
c i

2
. (A5)
The distinction between a firm i that has won or lost the auction is identical to that
under Cournot competition.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We start with the all-pay auction. The corresponding equilibrium strategy is βA(c ) =
m (c ), as we know from Proposition 1. We have to show that β ′
A
(c )< 0 under Cournot
competition. From (9) in combination with (21) and Lemma 3 we obtain, after some
simplifications and rearranging,
m ′(c ) =−E

πW (c ,c ,Z)−πL(c ,c ,Z) |Zk = c

g k (c )
−2γ2

E
hp
πL(c ,c ,Z)
i
+

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ (1−Gk (c ))

(A6)
where we have used the facts that
p
πW (c ,x ,Z) =
p
πL(c ,x ,Z)+

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ
and ∫ c
c
E [H (Z) |Zk = z k ] g k (z k )d z k = E [H (Z)] for any functionH .
Hence, we clearly have β ′
A
(c ) =m ′(c )< 0.
Now, consider the equilibrium strategies for the discriminatory and the uniform-
price auction given in Proposition 1. Again, those strategies must be strictly decreas-
ing in a separating equilibrium. Recallm (c ) = 0 and note that
βD(c ) = lim
c→c
m (c )
1−Gk (c )
= lim
c→c
−
m ′(c )
g k (c )
= βU (c ).
Observe using (A6) that −∞ < m ′(c ) < 0. However, g k (c ) = 0 if k < n − 1. Hence,
in that case, βD(c ) = βU (c )→∞ and bidding strategies cannot be strictly decreasing
everywhere. For a separating equilibrium, k = n −1 is therefore necessary.
Let k = n − 1. We will next derive sufficient conditions for β ′
U
(c ) < 0. Due to
Corollary 1 these conditions also imply β ′
D
(c )< 0. From (A6) we obtain
βU (c ) =−
m ′(c )
g n−1(c )
=λ1(c )+λ2(c )+λ3(c ).
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where
λ1(c ) := E

πW (c ,c ,Z)−πL(c ,c ,Z) |Zn−1 = c

λ2(c ) := 2γ2E
hp
πL(c ,c ,Z)
i 1
g n−1(c )
λ3(c ) := 2γ2

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ
1−Gn−1(c )
g n−1(c )
Sufficient for β ′
U
(c )< 0 is λ′
i
(c )< 0 for i = 1,2,3. Consider first λ1(c )where we have
λ1(c ) = 2

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫE
hp
πL(c ,c ,Z) |Zn−1 = c
i
+

1
2
+γ2+γ1
2
ǫ2
where
E
hp
πL(c ,c ,Z) |Zn−1 = c
i
= γ1 (n −2)E [C |C < c ]−

1
2
+γ2−γ1

c +γ0−kγ1ǫ.
Hence, λ′
1
(c )< 0 if and only if
γ1 (n −2)
d E [C |C < c ]
d c
−

1
2
+γ2−γ1

< 0.
When we assume F do be logconcave, this condition is fulfilled, because of (1) and
1
2
+γ2−γ1 (n −1)> 0. Consider λ2(c ) and note that
∂
∂ c
E
hp
πL(c ,c ,Z)
i
=δ2−
1
2
< 0.
Therefore, g ′
n−1
(c )≥ 0 is sufficient forλ′
2
(c )< 0. Moreover, g ′
n−1
(c )≥ 0 ensuresλ′
3
(c )<
0 as well. Obviously, convexity ofGn−1(c ) = F (c )n−1 is equivalent to g ′n−1(c )≥ 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider first the case of Cournot competition. We have
ΠW ′
1
(c ,x ,x )−ΠL′
1
(c ,x ,x ) = E

πW ′
1
(c ,x ,S I I (x ,Z1,...,k−1)) |Zk−1 < x ,Zk = x

− E

πL′
1
(c ,E [C |C >Zk ],S
I I I (Z1,...,k )) |Zk = x

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which implies
ΠW ′
1
(c ,x ,x )−ΠL′
1
(c ,x ,x ) =
− E
hp
πW (c ,x ,S I I (x ,Z1,...,k−1))−
p
πL(c ,E [C |C >Zk ],S I I I (Z1,...,k )) |Zk = x
i
such that
ΠW ′
1
(c ,x ,x )−ΠL′
1
(c ,x ,x ) =−
 
γ1+γ2

(E [C |C > x ]−x )−

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ.
Moreover, ΠL′′
12
(c ,x ,z k ) = 0 and
ΠW ′′
12
(c ,x ,z k ) = Pr[x <Zk−1,Zk = z k ]E [π
W ′′
12
(c ,x ,S I (Z1,...,k−1)) |x <Zk−1,Zk = z k ]
+Pr[Zk−1 < x ,Zk = z k ]E [π
W ′′
12
(c ,x ,S I I (x ,Z1,...,k−1)) |Zk−1 < x ,Zk = z k ]+
Pr[Zk−1 < x ,Zk = z k ]E [π
W ′′
13
(c ,x ,S I I (x ,Z1,...,k−1))S
I I ′
1
(x ,Z1,...,k−1))|Zk−1 < x ,Zk = z k ]
which implies
ΠW ′′
12
(c ,x ,z k ) = γ2−Pr[Zk−1 < x ,Zk = z k ]γ1 (n −k )
∂ E [C |C > x ]
∂ x
.
Thus,
U ′′
12
(c ,x ) =

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫg k (x )+
 
γ1+γ2

(E [C |C > x ]−x ) g k (x )
+
∫ c
x
γ2g k (z k )d z k −
∫ c
x
Pr[Zk−1 < x ,Zk = z k ]γ1 (n −k )
∂ E [C |C > x ]
∂ x
g k (z k )d z k .
Carrying out the integrals yields
U ′′
12
(c ,x ) =

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫg k (x )+
 
γ1+γ2

(E [C |C > x ]−x ) g k (x )
+γ2 (1−Gk (x ))−γ1 (Gk−1(x )−Gk (x )) (n −k )
∂ E [C |C > x ]
∂ x
since
∫ c
x
Pr[Zk−1 < x ,Zk = z k ]g k (z k )d z k = Pr[Zk−1 < x <Zk ] =Gk−1(x )−Gk (x ).
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Using the fact that
Gk−1(c )−Gk (c ) = g k (c )
1− F (c )
(n −k ) f (c )
(A7)
and
∂ E [C |C > c ]
∂ c
= (E [C |C > c ]− c )
f (c )
1− F (c )
(A8)
we obtain
U ′′
12
(c ,x ) =

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫg k (x )+γ2 (E [C |C > x ]−x ) g k (x )+γ2 (1−Gk (x )) . (A9)
Clearly,U ′′
12
(c ,x ) ≥ 0, i.e., (IC2) is fulfilled implying that under Cournot competition
the direct mechanism


m , I wb

generally is incentive compatible.
Now, consider the case of Bertrand competition. Replace γ1 by δ1 and γ2 by −δ2
in (A9) in order to obtain
U ′′
12
(c ,x ) =

1
2
−δ2+δ1

ǫg k (x )−δ2 (E [C |C > x ]−x ) g k (x )−δ2 (1−Gk (x )) .
If k > 1, we haveU ′′
12
(c ,c )< 0 as c → c . Hence, k = 1 is necessary for incentive com-
patibility. With k = 1, the necessary conditionU ′′
12
(c ,c )≥ 0 from Lemma 1 simplifies
to 
1
2
−δ2+δ1

ǫ−δ2 (E [C |C > c ]− c )−δ2
1− F (c )
(n −1) f (c )
≥ 0
since 1−G1(z )
g 1(z )
=
1−F (z )
(n−1) f (z )
. This condition also implies (IC2).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
In order for the discriminatory auctionwith thewinning bids revealed to have a sepa-
rating equilibrium, the corresponding equilibrium bidding strategy has to be strictly
decreasing. As it is more convenient analytically, we will in the following work with
strategy βU rather than βD . Recall from Corollary 1 that β
′
U
(c ) < 0 always implies
β ′
D
(c ) < 0. As a first step, we prove the following lemma concerning the equilibrium
bidding strategy of the uniform-price auction where the winning bids are revealed
which we denote by βwb
U
(c ).
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Lemma A1. Under Cournot competition, equilibrium strategy βwb
U
(c ) can be simpli-
fied as follows:
βwb
U
(c ) =
1−Gk−1(c )
g k (c )
2γ2Ω
I (c )
+2

γ2 {E [C |C > c ]− c }+γ2
1− F (c )
(n −k ) f (c )
+

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ

ΩI I (c )
−
 
γ1+γ2

{E [C |C > c ]− c }+

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ
2
(A10)
where
ΩI (c ) := γ0+γ1E

S I (Z1,...,k−1) |c <Zk−1

−γ2c −
1
2
c +

1
2
+γ2− (k −1)γ1

ǫ
and
ΩI I (c ) := γ0+γ1 {(k −1)E [C |C < c ]+ (n −k )E [C |C > c ]}
−γ2c −
1
2
c +

1
2
+γ2− (k −1)γ1

ǫ.
If f (c ) is logconcave, then dΩ
I (c )
d c
< 0 as well as dΩ
I I (c )
d c
< 0.
Proof. Since with only the winning bids revealed ΠL′
2
(c ,c ,z k ) = 0, we have
βwb
U
(c ) = ΠW (c ,c ,c )−ΠL(c ,c ,c )−
1
g k (c )
∫ c
c
ΠW ′
2
(c ,c ,z k )g k (z k )d z k .
Starting with
ΠW (c ,c ,c )−ΠL(c ,c ,c ) = E

πW (c ,c ,S I I (c ,Z1,...,k−1))
−πL(c ,E [C |C >Zk ],S
I I I (Z1,...,k )) |Zk = c

we find, after plugging in profits under Cournot competition and engaging in some
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rearranging,
ΠW (c ,c ,c )−ΠL(c ,c ,c ) = 2
 
γ1+γ2

{E [C |C > c ]− c }+

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ

ΩI I (c )
−
 
γ1+γ2

{E [C |C > c ]− c }+

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ
2
where ΩI I (c ) is defined in Lemma A1. From (24) we find, using the fact that
S I (z1,...,k−2,x ) =S
I I (x ,z1,...,k−2,x ),
ΠW ′
2
(c ,x ,z k ) = Pr[x <Zk−1,Zk = z k ]E

πW ′
2
(c ,x ,S I (Z1,...,k−1)) |x <Zk−1,Zk = z k

+Pr[Zk−1 < x ,Zk = z k ]E

πW ′
2
(c ,x ,S I I (x ,Z1,...,k−1))
+πW ′
3
(c ,x ,S I I (x ,Z1,...,k−1))S
I I ′
1
(x ,Z1,...,k−1) |Zk−1 < x ,Zk = z k

such that
∫ c
c
ΠW ′
2
(c ,c ,z k )g k (z k )d z k = Pr[c <Zk−1]E

πW ′
2
(c ,c ,S I (Z1,...,k−1)) |c <Zk−1

+Pr[Zk−1 < c <Zk ]E

πW ′
2
(c ,c ,S I I (c ,Z1,...,k−1))
+πW ′
3
(c ,c ,S I I (c ,Z1,...,k−1))S
I I ′
1
(c ,Z1,...,k−1) |Zk−1 < c <Zk

.
Plugging in Cournot profits and rearranging we obtain
∫ c
c
ΠW ′
2
(c ,c ,z k )g k (z k )d z k =− (1−Gk−1(c ))2γ2Ω
I (c )
− (Gk−1(c )−Gk (c ))2

γ2−γ1 (n −k )
d E [C |C > c ]
d c

ΩI I (c )
where ΩI (c ) is defined in Lemma A1. Hence, using (A7) and (A8), we finally obtain
(A10).
Assuming f to be logconcave, we immediately find
dΩI I (c )
d c
≤ γ1 (n −1)−γ2−
1
2
< 0.
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We are left to show that dΩ
I (c )
d c
< 0 as well. Due to the law of iterated expectations
E

S I (Z1,...,k−1) |c <Zk−1

= E
h∑n−1
j=1
Z j |c <Zk−1
i
= E
h∑k−2
j=1
Z j |c <Zk−1
i
+(n −k +1)E [C |C > c ] .
Note that
(1−Gk−1(c ))E
h∑k−2
j=1
Z j |c <Zk−1
i
= (1−Gk−2(c ))E
h∑k−2
j=1
Z j |c <Zk−2
i
+(Gk−2(c )−Gk−1(c ))E
h∑k−2
j=1
Z j |Zk−2 < c <Zk−1
i
= (1−Gk−2(c ))E
h∑k−3
j=1
Z j |c <Zk−2
i
+(1−Gk−2(c ))E [Zk−2 |c <Zk−2]
+ (Gk−2(c )−Gk−1(c )) (k −2)E [C |C < c ]
=
k−2∑
s=1
{(1−Gs (c ))E [Zs |c <Zs ]+ (Gs (c )−Gs+1(c ))s E [C |C < c ]}
and therefore
E
h∑k−2
j=1
Z j |c <Zk−1
i
=
k−2∑
s=1
ωs (c )
where
ωs (c ) :=
1−Gs (c )
1−Gk−1(c )
E [Zs |Zs > c ]+
Gs (c )−Gk−1(c )
1−Gk−1(c )
E [C |C < c ] .
Taking the derivative, we have
ω′
s
(c ) =
1−Gs (c )
1−Gk−1(c )
d E [Zs |Zs > c ]
d c
+
Gs (c )−Gk−1(c )
1−Gk−1(c )
d E [C |C < c ]
d c
+
d
d c

1−Gs (c )
1−Gk−1(c )

(E [Zs |Zs > c ]− E [C |C < c ]) .
From Theorem 3.3 in Nanda and Shaked (2001) follows d
d c

1−Gs (c )
1−Gk−1(c )

≤ 0 for s < k−1.
Consequently, for logconcave f ,ω′
s
(c )≤ 1, and therefore
dΩI (c )
d c
≤ γ1 (n −1)−γ2−
1
2
< 0.
We are now ready to prove the proposition, separately looking at the Cournot and
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the Bertrand case.
A.5.1 Cournot competition
According to Proposition 4 the corresponding direct mechanism generally is incen-
tive compatible under Cournot competition. The discriminatory auction therefore
has a separating equilibrium if d
d c
βwb
U
(c )< 0. From (A10) we obtain
dβwb
U
(c )
d c
=H1(c )
dΩI (c )
d c
+H2(c )
dΩI I (c )
d c
+
dH1(c )
d c
ΩI (c )+
dH2(c )
d c
ΩI I (c )+
dH3(c )
d c
where
H1(c ) := 2γ2
1−Gk−1(c )
g k (c )
,
H2(c ) := 2

γ2 {E [C |C > c ]− c }+γ2
1− F (c )
(n −k ) f (c )
+

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ

,
H3(c ) := −
 
γ1+γ2

{E [C |C > c ]− c }+

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ
2
.
For logconcave f , Lemma A1 implies H1(c )
dΩI (c )
d c
+H2(c )
dΩI I (c )
d c
< 0 for all c ∈
 
c ,c

.
Moreover, logconcavity of f also implies logconcavity of 1−Gk−1(c ) which, together
with the fact that
g k−1(c )
g k (c )
= k−1
n−k
1−F (c )
F (c )
is decreasing in c , implies that
1−Gk−1(c )
g k (c )
is decreas-
ing in c . Consequently, for logconcave f , dH1(c )
d c
≤ 0 and dH2(c )
d c
≤ 0 but dH3(c )
d c
≥ 0. Now,
note that both ΩI and ΩI I are increasing in γ0 while H1, H2, and H3 are unaffected
by a change in γ0. γ0 is in turn increasing in a . Logconcavity of f does not rule out
dH1(c )
d c
=
dH2(c )
d c
= 0. But note that dH2(c )
d c
= 0 implies dH3(c )
d c
= 0. Hence, there exists an a ∗
such that for all a ≥ a ∗
−
dH1(c )
d c
ΩI (c )−
dH2(c )
d c
ΩI I (c )≥
dH3(c )
d c
.
This condition is sufficient for d
d c
βwb
U
(c ) < 0 and therefore implies the existence of a
separating equilibrium.
A.5.2 Bertrand competition
From Proposition 4 we know that under Bertrand competition a separating equilib-
rium is possible only if k = 1. By adapting (A10) to the Bertrand case and setting
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k = 1, we obtain
dβwb
U
(c )
d c
= H˜2(c )
d Ω˜I I (c )
d c
+
d H˜2(c )
d c
Ω˜I I (c )+
d H˜3(c )
d c
where
Ω˜I I (c ) :=δ0+δ1 (n −1)E [C |C > c ]+δ2c −
1
2
c +

1
2
−δ2

ǫ,
H˜2(c ) := 2

−δ2 {E [C |C > c ]− c }−δ2
1− F (c )
(n −1) f (c )
+

1
2
−δ2+δ1

ǫ

,
H˜3(c ) := −

(δ1−δ2){E [C |C > c ]− c }+

1
2
−δ2+δ1

ǫ
2
.
Assuming f to be logconcave and observing that δ1−δ2 > 0, we find
d Ω˜I I (c )
d c
≤δ1 (n −1)+δ2−
1
2
< 0,
d H˜2(c )
d c
= 2δ2
n
1− d E [C |C>c ]
d c
− d
d c

1−F (c )
f (c )

1
n−1
o
> 0,
d H˜3(c )
d c
= 2

(δ1−δ2){E [C |C > c ]− c }+
¦
1
2
−δ2+δ1
©
ǫ

(δ1−δ2)
¦
1− d E [C |C>c ]
d c
©
> 0.
Now, note that since d H˜2(c )
d c
Ω˜I I (c )+ d H˜3(c )
d c
> 0 and d Ω˜
I I (c )
d c
< 0,
dβwbU (c )
d c
< 0 implies H˜2(c )>
0. In turn, H˜2(c )> 0 implies (25). Thus,
dβwbU (c )
d c
< 0 also implies that the corresponding
direct mechanism is incentive compatible.
dβwbU (c )
d c
< 0 is therefore sufficient for the
separating equilibrium to exist.
Suppose d = 0 and hence δ1 =δ2 = 0. In this case, we have
d Ω˜I I (c )
d c
< 0 and H˜2(c ) =
ǫ whereas d H˜2(c )
d c
=
d H˜3(c )
d c
= 0. Given ǫ > 0, this clearly implies
dβwbU (c )
d c
< 0. With
dβwbU (c )
d c
being continuous in d , we conclude that there exists a d ∗ ∈ (0,1] such that
dβwbU (c )
d c
< 0
for all c ∈

c ,c

if d ≤ d ∗.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider first the case of Cournot competition. We find
ΠW ′
1
(c ,x ,x )−ΠL′
1
(c ,x ,x ) =πW ′
1
(c ,E [C |C < x ],S I (x ))−πL′
1
(c ,x ,S I I (x ))
=−
 
γ1+γ2

(x − E [C |C < x ])−

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ
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and
ΠW ′′
12
(c ,x ,z k ) = 0
as well as
ΠL′′
12
(c ,x ,z k ) =−
¦
πL′
1
(c ,x ,S I I (x ))−πL′
1
(c ,E [C |C > x ],S I I I (x ))
© g k ,k+1(z k ,x )
g k (z k )
+
¦
πL′′
12
(c ,x ,S I I (x ))+πL′′
13
(c ,x ,S I I (x ))S I I ′(x )
©∫ c
x
g k ,k+1(z k ,z k+1)
g k (z k )
d z k+1
which implies
∫ x
c
ΠL′′
12
(c ,x ,z k )g k (z k )d z k =
−
¦
πL′
1
(c ,x ,S I I (x ))−πL′
1
(c ,E [C |C > x ],S I I I (x ))
©
g k+1(x )
+
¦
πL′′
12
(c ,x ,S I I (x ))+πL′′
13
(c ,x ,S I I (x ))S I I ′(x )
©
(Gk (x )−Gk+1(x )) .
In turn, this yields
∫ x
c
ΠL′′
12
(c ,x ,z k )g k (z k )d z k =
 
γ1+γ2

(E [C |C > x ]−x ) g k+1(x )
+
¦
γ2−γ1S
I I ′(x )
©
(Gk (x )−Gk+1(x )) .
Thus,
U ′′
12
(c ,x ) =

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫg k (x )+
 
γ1+γ2

(x − E [C |C < x ]) g k (x )
+
 
γ1+γ2

(E [C |C > x ]−x ) g k+1(x )+
¦
γ2−γ1S
I I ′(x )
©
(Gk (x )−Gk+1(x )) . (A11)
Consider the following useful fact about order statistics:
Gk (c )−Gk+1(c ) = g k (c )
F (c )
k f (c )
= g k+1(c )
1− F (c )
(n −k −1) f (c )
. (A12)
Moreover, since
S I I ′(c ) = k
∂ E [C |C < c ]
∂ c
+(n −k −1)
∂ E [C |C > c ]
∂ c
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and because of
∂ E [C |C < c ]
∂ c
= (c − E [C |C < c ])
f (c )
F (c )
and (A8), (A11) simplifies to
U ′′
12
(c ,x ) =

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫg k (x )+γ2 (x − E [C |C < x ]) g k (x )
+γ2 (E [C |C > x ]−x ) g k+1(x )+γ2 (Gk (x )−Gk+1(x )) . (A13)
Clearly, U ′′
12
(c ,x ) ≥ 0, i.e., (IC2) holds. Hence, the direct mechanism


m , I hl b

is in-
centive compatible under Cournot competition.
Now, consider the case of Bertrand competition. Again, we replace γ1 by δ1 and
γ2 by −δ2 in (A13) in order to obtain
U ′′
12
(c ,x ) =

1
2
−δ2+δ1

ǫg k (x )−δ2 (x − E [C |C < x ]) g k (x )
−δ2 (E [C |C > x ]−x ) g k+1(x )−δ2 (Gk (x )−Gk+1(x )) .
Hence, dividing by g k (c ) andmaking use of (A12), the necessary conditionU ′′12(c ,c )≥
0 for incentive compatibility of


m , I hl b

simplifies to

1
2
−δ2+δ1

ǫ−δ2 (c − E [C |C < c ])
−δ2 (E [C |C > c ]− c )
n −k −1
k
F (c )
1− F (c )
−δ2
F (c )
k f (c )
≥ 0.
Again, this condition is also equivalent to (IC2).
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
We begin this proof with a lemma that shows some implications of the assumptions
on F we have made at the beginning of Section 2.
Lemma A2. The assumptions f (c ) > 0 and f ′(c ) ∈ R for all c ∈

c ,c

imply that, for
all c ∈

c ,c

,
F (c )
f (c )
∈R+,
1− F (c )
f (c )
∈R+,
d
d c

F (c )
f (c )

∈R,
d
d c

1− F (c )
f (c )

∈R,
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d E [C |C < c ]
d c
∈R+,
d E [C |C > c ]
d c
∈R+, (A14)
and
d 2E [C |C > c ]
d c 2
∈R. (A15)
Proof. Obviously, f (c )> 0 implies F (c )
f (c )
∈R+ and
1−F (c )
f (c )
∈R+. Moreover, from
d
d c

F (c )
f (c )

= 1−
F (c )
f (c )
f ′ (c )
f (c )
and
d
d c

1− F (c )
f (c )

=−1−
1− F (c )
f (c )
f ′ (c )
f (c )
we see that f ′(c )∈R implies d
d c

F (c )
f (c )

∈R and d
d c

1−F (c )
f (c )

∈R.
Let us turn to (A14). Observe that, using integration by parts, one can show
E [C |C < c ] = c −
∫ c
c
F (z )d z
F (c )
and E [C |C > c ] = c +
∫ c
c
(1− F (z ))d z
1− F (c )
.
Hence,
d E [C |C < c ]
d c
=
∫ c
c
F (z )d z
F (c )2
f (c ) and
d E [C |C > c ]
d c
=
∫ c
c
(1− F (z ))d z
(1− F (c ))2
f (c ).
Clearly, d E [C |C<c ]
d c
∈ R+ for all c ∈
 
c ,c

and d E [C |C>c ]
d c
∈ R+ for all c ∈

c ,c

. But what
about c → c and c → c , respectively? Applying l’Hôpital’s rule we find
lim
c→c
d E [C |C < c ]
d c
= f (c ) lim
c→c
F (c )
2F (c ) f (c )
=
1
2
and
lim
c→c
d E [C |C > c ]
d c
= f (c ) lim
c→c
− (1− F (c ))
−2 (1− F (c )) f (c )
=
1
2
(A16)
such that (A14) indeed holds for all c ∈

c ,c

. Now, consider
d 2E [C |C > c ]
d c 2
=
2 f (c )
∫ c
c
(1− F (z ))d z − (1− F (c ))2
(1− F (c ))3
f (c )+
d E [C |C > c ]
d c
f ′(c )
f (c )
.
We immediately see that f (c ) > 0 and f ′(c ) ∈ R imply d
2E [C |C>c ]
d c 2
∈ R for all c ∈

c ,c

.
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Applying l’Hôpital’s rule and making use of (A16), we obtain
lim
c→c
d 2E [C |C > c ]
d c 2
= f (c ) lim
c→c
2 f ′(c )
∫ c
c
(1− F (z ))d z
−3 (1− F (c ))2 f (c )
+
1
2
f ′(c )
f (c )
=
1
6
f ′(c )
f (c )
which completes the proof of (A15).
Let us first focus on the case of Cournot competition. In this case it can be shown
that if the highest losing bid is revealed, equilibrium bidding in the uniform-price
auction takes the following form:
βU (c ) = 2

γ2ρ1(c )+

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ
p
πL
 
c ,c ,S I I (c )

+ρ2(c )
2−ρ3(c )
2n −k −1
k
F (c ) (1− F (c ))
f (c )2
where
ρ1(c ) := c − E [C |C < c ]+

(n −k −1)
d E [C |C > c ]
d c
+1

F (c )
k f (c )
,
ρ2(c ) :=
 
γ1+γ2

(c − E [C |C < c ])+

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ,
ρ3(c ) :=
 
γ1+γ2
 d E [C |C > c ]
d c
.
Hence, we have
β ′
U
(c ) = 2γ2ρ
′
1
(c )
p
πL
 
c ,c ,S I I (c )

+2

γ2ρ1(c )+

1
2
+γ2+γ1

ǫ

∂
∂ c
p
πL
 
c ,c ,S I I (c )

+2ρ2(c )ρ
′
2
(c )
−2ρ3(c )ρ
′
3
(c )
n −k −1
k
F (c ) (1− F (c ))
f (c )2
−ρ3(c )
2n −k −1
k
d
d c

F (c )
f (c )
1− F (c )
f (c )

.
Noting that
ρ′
1
(c ) = 1− d E [C |C<c ]
d c
+

(n −k −1) d
2E [C |C>c ]
d c 2

F (c )
k f (c )
+

(n −k −1) d E [C |C>c ]
d c
+1

d
d c

F (c )
k f (c )

,
ρ′
2
(c ) =
 
γ1+γ2

1− d E [C |C<c ]
d c

, ρ′
3
(c ) =
 
γ1+γ2
 d 2E [C |C>c ]
d c 2
,
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and
∂
∂ c
p
πL
 
c ,c ,S I I (c )

=−

1
2
+γ2−γ1

k d E [C |C<c ]
d c
+(n −k −1) d E [C |C>c ]
d c

,
we find that Lemma A2 implies β ′
U
(c )∈R for all c ∈

c ,c

. Furthermore, observe that
β ′
U
(c ) is continuous in γ0, γ1, and γ2. As γ0, γ1, and γ2 are continuous in d , β
′
U
(c ) is
also continuous in d .
Now consider the case of Bertrand competition. We can simply reuse the results
for the Cournot case by replacing γ0, γ1, and γ2 with δ0, δ1, and −δ2, respectively.
Similarly, we obtain that β ′
U
(c )∈R and that β ′
U
(c ) is continuous in d .
Setting d = 0 implies γ1 = γ2 = δ1 = δ2 = 0. Consequently, under both Cournot
and Bertrand competition we have β ′
U
(c ) =− 1
2
ǫ if d = 0. Because β ′
U
(c ) is finite and
continuous in d , we conclude that, given ǫ > 0, there exists a d ∗ ∈ (0,1] such that for
all d ≤ d ∗, β ′
U
(c )< 0.
According to Proposition 6, β ′
U
(c ) < 0 is enough to guarantee the existence of a
separating equilibrium for the case of Cournot competition. Yet under Bertrand com-
petition, in addition to β ′
U
(c ) < 0, (26) must also hold. Using (A8), (26) is equivalent
to
¦
1
2
−δ2+δ1
©
ǫ−δ2 (c − E [C |C < c ])−δ2

(n −k −1) d E [C |C>c ]
d c
+1

F (c )
k f (c )
≥ 0.
From Lemma A2, the LHS of this inequality is bigger than−∞ for all c ∈

c ,c

. More-
over, it is continuous in d . For d = 0, (26) is equivalent to requiring ǫ ≥ 0. Conse-
quently, there is a d ∗ ∈ (0,1] such that (26) is fulfilled for all d ≤ d ∗.
References
AN, M. Y. (1998): “Logconcavity versus Logconvexity: A Complete Characterization,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 80(2), 350–369.
BAGNOLI, M. AND T. BERGSTROM (2005): “Log-concave probability and its applica-
tions,” Economic Theory, 26(2), 445–469.
BAYE, M. R., D. KOVENOCK, AND C. G. DE VRIES (1993): “Rigging the Lobbying Process:
An Application of the All-Pay Auction,” The American Economic Review, 83(1), 289–
294.
DAS VARMA, G. (2003): “Bidding for a process innovation under alternative modes of
competition,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(1), 15–37.
51
DAVID, H. AND H. NAGARAJA (2003): Order Statistics, Third Edition, Wiley.
GAL-OR, E. (1986): “Information Transmission–Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria,”
The Review of Economic Studies, 53(1), 85–92.
GIEBE, T. AND E. WOLFSTETTER (2008): “License auctions with royalty contracts for
(winners and) losers,” Games and Economic Behavior, 63(1), 91–106.
GOEREE, J. K. (2003): “Bidding for the future: signaling in auctions with an aftermar-
ket,” Journal of Economic Theory, 108(2), 345–364.
JEHIEL, P. AND B. MOLDOVANU (2000): “Auctions with Downstream Interaction among
Buyers,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 31(4), 768–791.
KATSENOS, G. (2008): “Simultaneous and Sequential Auctions of Oligopoly Licen-
ses,” Working Paper, University of Hannover, available at http://www.wiwi.
uni-hannover.de/mik/download/katsenos/SqcAuct-OligLic.pdf.
KATZMAN, B. AND M. RHODES-KROPF (2008): “The Consequences of Information Re-
vealed in Auctions,” Applied Economics Research Bulletin, Special Issue I (Auc-
tions), 53–87.
MOLDOVANU, B. AND A. SELA (2003): “Patent licensing to Bertrand competitors,” Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(1), 1–13.
NANDA, A. AND M. SHAKED (2001): “The Hazard Rate and the Reversed Hazard Rate
Orders, with Applications to Order Statistics,” Annals of the Institute of Statistical
Mathematics, 53(4), 853–864.
ZIV, A. (1993): “Information Sharing in Oligopoly: The Truth-Telling Problem,” The
RAND Journal of Economics, 24(3), 455–465.
52
